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This thesis addresses the problem of optimal evacuation of a naval ship.  We 
propose the use of a dynamic escape-route system which employs a signaling system to 
adapt the emergency egress process to the instigating contingency.  
The evacuation process is represented by a nonlinear network optimization model 
with an objective function that integrates two conflicting goals: the average evacuation 
time and the ship’s integrity.  The nonlinearity in the model results from (1) speed being 
a nonlinear function of concurrent flow on passageways, and (2) delays caused by 
opening closures.  We also account for counter-flows and passageways used by repair 
parties.   
The problem is heuristically solved through an iterative process that updates 
speeds and delays as it proceeds, and dynamically adds valid inequalities to avoid 
counter-flows.  A bound on the solution quality is obtained by solving the problem under 
optimistic conditions.   
Compared to static routes in a modern frigate, model solutions show that dynamic 
routes can improve the average evacuation time by 20%, reduce the time of the last 
evacuee by 25%, and improve ship integrity.  We also demonstrate that even greater 
improvements are achievable with minor design changes in the ship. 
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This thesis addresses the problem of optimal evacuation of a naval ship.  
Specifically, we propose and demonstrate the use of a dynamic escape-route system.  
This system uses signals that adapt to the instigating contingency and optimally guide 
personnel through egress routes to mustering stations.  The system optimizes a weighted 
combination of average evacuation time and a measure of ship integrity. 
 Before the event of abandonment, we encounter up to three opportunities to set up 
escape routes: (1) Normal-operation phase: Escape-route signals can be configured based 
on the actual crew distribution (e.g. general quarters) and the ordered material condition 
of readiness; (2) Awareness phase: Escape routes can be set up based on, for example, the 
direction of an approaching missile and the most likely impact zone; and, (3) Salvage 
phase: Escape routes can be configured to account for identified damaged and 
unavailable passages. 
We represent the evacuation process of a naval ship by a nonlinear network-flow 
optimization model. The network’s topology is derived from technical and construction 
drawings, with nodes representing compartments, closures and intersections, and arcs 
representing passages and stairways. Source nodes represent groups of collocated 
crewmembers, and modified sink nodes represent mustering stations.  The objective 
function integrates two factors: (1) The average evacuation time of all the groups of 
crewmembers, and (2) the watertight and airtight integrity of the ship after the muster 
phase of the evacuation.  These two objectives can conflict, however: For example, 
opening a watertight door may speed egress, but may also degrade the ship’s integrity. 
 The nonlinearity in the optimization model arises from two factors: (1) Speed is a 
nonlinear function of concurrent flow on a passageway. This means that the speed at 
which crewmembers traverse a given arc depends on how many attempt to do that 
simultaneously. (2) A delay is incurred by a group that first reaches and opens a 
watertight or airtight door, but that delay does not directly apply to groups that pass 
through that doorway subsequently.  Another complexity of this model results from the 
large number of constraints that may be needed to avoid counter-flows.  
 xviii
The optimization problem is heuristically solved in an iterative algorithm that (1) 
fixes nonlinear terms involving speeds and delays, (2) solves a linear approximating 
model, (3) adds valid inequalities to eliminate counter-flows currently exhibited, and (4) 
repeats steps (1)-(3) until a consistent solution is found.  A bound on the solution quality 
is obtained by solving the problem under ideal conditions (i.e., maximum walking speed 
with all doors opened).   
Solutions obtained using data from a modern Spanish frigate show that a dynamic 
escape-route system can improve evacuation time by 20% and improve the ship’s 
integrity by 26% compared to a system of static routes.  Moreover, we demonstrate that 
with minor design changes, these improvements can be even greater. 
This model could be a useful tool for the design and operation of the naval ship.  
We recommend further study using fully validated data and simulation exercises on 
existing ships and ship prototypes for the purpose of a more realistic assessment of the 




This thesis addresses the problem of optimal evacuation of a naval ship.  We 
propose the use of a dynamic escape-route system which uses signals to adapt the 
emergency egress process to the instigating contingency.  
 
A. BETTER EVACUATION OF NAVAL SHIPS 
1. The Problem 
Because of their combatant nature, naval ships are exposed to more threats than 
passenger and other commercial ships. The abandonment of a naval ship is an unlikely 
event, but if it does occur, it is likely to be under the worst of circumstances.  Thus, the 
evacuation leading up to abandonment must be accomplished as quickly and effectively 
as possible. 
Doctrine regarding the evacuation process is evolving in order to accommodate 
two tendencies: (1) Manning reduction (Lazinsky, 2005; Hinkle, 2004), and (2) 
adaptation of non-naval rules for naval ship design and construction (Marinelog, 2004). 
Due to reduced manning levels on modern naval ships, the size of damage-control 
parties has been reduced. Thus, we contend that, nowadays, a naval ship in distress is 
more likely than ever to be abandoned.  
Naval ships are exempt from Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) regulations, which 
are mandatory for merchant ships (Taylor, 2004).  However, some navies, like the British 
Royal Navy, are already moving towards SOLAS (called “naval SOLAS”). The 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) is in charge, under the United Nations, of 
establishing standards and procedures (see MSC/Circ. 1033, 2002) that satisfy SOLAS, 
but naval ships are only required to achieve a level of safety that is “as good as” that of 
merchant ships (Taylor, 2004).  
However, the U.S. Coast Guard has raised concerns regarding the methodology 
used by the IMO for analyzing the passenger-ship evacuation process (Evacuation 
Analysis Plan, 2005).  The data used by these models and some modeling simplifications 
are some of the sources of major criticism: 
2 
• The analysis methodology is based on that intended for buildings.  For 
example, data regarding the speed of evacuees is derived from stairs, 
corridors and doors in civil building (SFPE Fire Protection Engineering 
Handbook, 1995). 
• Effects of ship motion, passenger age and disability, restricted visibility 
due to smoke and other difficulties, are accounted for only through a 
vaguely defined “safety factor.” 
• The methodology assumes that people can move unhindered, that no 
escape routes are blocked, and that all passengers will evacuate via 
primary routes. 
At present, evacuation systems on naval ships, as on passenger and merchant 
ships, use static signals to mark escape routes and direct evacuees to mustering stations.  
These systems do not make any provision for blocked passages and/or closures, but 
rather, rely on crewmembers’ skills to find an alternative route if they find a blocked 
passage. 
Because a naval ships’ crew is a well-trained, homogeneous group, and its 
members have considerable knowledge of their ship, we may expect that a naval crew 
will be able to evacuate its ship more efficiently than, for example, an untrained, 
heterogeneous group passengers on a passenger vessel.  However, even for naval crews, 
static evacuation signals can be inefficient.  A better system is possible. 
This thesis explores the use of a dynamic escape-route system (DER) in the 
evacuation process of a naval ship, and compares that system to the current static one.  
Escape routes in a DER may be configured to accommodate factors such as crew 
distribution, expected threats, or actual damage to the ship. 
We demonstrate the improvements that a DER may have over a static escape-
route system by: 
• Reducing the average evacuation time (and, as a by-product, the time of 
the last evacuee), and 
• Improving the ship’s watertight and airtight integrity, which, in turn will: 
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o Increase the likelihood of successfully salvaging the ship, and 
o Increase the likelihood that the crew is rescued safely. 
It will be possible to reduce evacuation time with DER because the flow of 
evacuees can be better controlled to reduce overcrowding, to avoid passageways that are 
impassable, etc.  The ship’s integrity can be improved because the number of watertight 
and airtight closures that must be opened can be minimized. 
 
2.  The Model 
This “optimal evacuation problem” is addressed by building a multi-commodity 
directed-network model derived from technical drawings: Nodes represent compartments, 
closures and intersections, and arcs represent passages and stairways. 
Each group of evacuees in a compartment is viewed as a “commodity,” and 
compartment occupancy at the time of the contingency represents “supply” of that 
commodity at a source node.  Nodes representing mustering station are connected by arcs 
to a super-sink whose demand equals the total supply of evacuees.  Each of these arcs has 
a capacity that represents the limit on the number of evacuees that may occupy the 
particular mustering station. 
The objective function integrates two factors: (1) The average evacuation time of 
all the groups of crewmembers, and (2) the watertight and airtight integrity of the ship 
after the muster phase of the evacuation.  These two objectives can conflict, however:  
For example, opening a watertight door may speed egress, but it may also degrade the 
ship’s integrity. 
The non-linearity in the network optimization model arises from two main 
factors: (1) Speed is a nonlinear function of concurrent flow on a passageway.  This 
means that the speed at which crewmembers traverse a given arc depends on the number 
of crewmembers that are attempting to traverse that arc simultaneously.  (2) A delay is 
applied to the first group that reaches and opens a watertight or airtight door, but not 
directly to groups that cross through that doorway subsequently.  
We solve the problem approximately with a customized heuristic algorithm that 
uses a technique similar to successive linear programming (e.g., Fletcher and Sainz, 
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1989).  Essentially, in each iteration, we replace nonlinear terms such as ( )h x x  with 
ˆ( )h x x , using the most recently computed value of x as xˆ , and then solve the resulting, 
approximating linear program.  The new solution is used to readjust nonlinear terms, and 
the process repeats until no further adjustments are necessary.  A bound on solution 
quality is obtained by solving the problem under ideal conditions (i.e., maximum walking 
speed with all doors opened).   
We test our model and algorithm using data from a recently built Spanish F-100 
frigate, the ÁLVARO DE BAZÁN. 
 
3. Justification Of Dynamic Escape Routes 
After studying the methodology used to evaluate the evacuation process of 
passenger and merchant ships required by the IMO (MSC/Circ 1033, 2002), we identify 
important differences with the analogous process for naval ships with respect to (1) the 
makeup of a shipboard population, (2) the sequence of events leading up to an 
evacuation, and (3) information about the shipboard population’s location.  We can take 
advantage of these differences in order to improve the evacuation process on naval ships 
through DER:   
• We may assume that the disciplined crew of a naval ship will expect and 
respect dynamic signaling. Their training and homogeneity ensures that 
they will be able to move at pre-specified speeds, and open any closures 
they meet along their way, and complete their egress in approximately the 
same time as estimated by a good model.  (The population aboard a 
passenger ship is heterogeneous and lacks training.) 
• The predictable sequence of events before a naval ship evacuation takes 
place allows us to configure dynamic escape routes in advance of an 
evacuation.  (The events leading up to the evacuation of a passenger vessel 
are less predictable.) 
• As we shall see, the initial physical distribution of the crew plays a 
decisive role in establishing good evacuation routes.  Based on a naval 
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ships’ organization book, crew distribution can be determined by 
compartment, almost exactly, at any time.  (The nature of a passenger ship 
makes this impossible.)   
A system that considers a crew’s physical distribution and responds dynamically 
to a particular contingency must be better than one that is static, as long as it functions 
properly: The DER problem is a mathematical relaxation of the static problem, so the 
solution must be better if it is implemented correctly. 
 
B. NAVAL SHIPS EVACUATION PROCESS 
The evacuation process of a naval ship (see Figure 1) is a complex process, 
involving more events and procedures than on a passenger ship (which is described in 
detail in IMO’s MSC/Circ. 1033, 2002).  
Naval ships may be anchored or moored in a harbor, transiting to an area of 
operations, conducting exercises or even fighting. The range of normal operating 
conditions is broad but, whatever the situation is, the crew will be distributed onboard in 
accordance with ship’s organization book.  Naval ships also have a great level of 
situational awareness and may anticipate a threat, such as an incoming missile.  
Moreover, when damage occurs, a damage control officer should be able to quickly 
assess the extent of damage (Practical Damage Control, 1993). 
If a naval ship must be evacuated, the initial status of its crew and the ship’s 
condition should be better defined than in a commercial vessel. Thus, we may be able to 
improve the evacuation process. 
Analyzing the sequence of events that may lead to ship abandonment, we identify 
three opportunities to configure escape routes: 
• During the “Normal Operation Phase” or “Pre-abandonment Phase,” 
which spans the period before the event that triggers ship abandonment.  
Escape routes can be configured based on two factors: 
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o “Crew distribution,” ordered by the commanding officer (CO),  
determines which stations are manned and to what extent. 
Representative instances are: 
 General Quarters: The ship is in battle condition and the 
totality of the crew is located at combat stations. 
 Watch: About one third of the crew is located in control 
and weapons stations, one third is resting in their cabins 
and the rest of crew is working in offices or relaxing in 
living rooms. 
 Port: All crewmembers but the guards are resting in cabins 
and berthing rooms. This is a plausible scenario at night 
when the ship is in a non-home port. 
o Material Condition Readiness (MCR), which is the degree of 
access and system closure in effect at a given time, in anticipation 
of potential damage to the ship’s integrity. All closures (doors, 
hatches, etc.) on board are marked with a letter (X, Y, Z). Based on 
this mark and the ordered MCR (XRAY, YOKE or ZEBRA), 
Table 1 shows whether a closure is closed or open. XRAY 
provides the least watertight and airtight integrity and the greatest 
access throughout the ship, whereas ZEBRA provides the greatest 
degree of integrity and the least accessibility. 
                          Ordered MCR 
  XRAY YOKE ZEBRA 
X Closed Closed Closed 
Y Open Closed Closed Closure mark 
Z Open Open Closed 
Table 1. Material Condition of Readiness.  A ship’s closures remain open or 
closed depending on their marks and the current MCR.  
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• A second opportunity to set up escape routes is present when an enemy 
weapon is shot or launched at the ship and is detected before impact.  
Despite the limited time available, it is possible to anticipate a likely 
location of the impact (for example, the ship will maneuver to offer 
reduced radar cross section to the missile). 
• Finally, if hit, the ship is not immediately abandoned.  Repair parties will 
conduct a damage assessment and will try to control and extinguish fires 
and/or block flooding in order to maintain fighting capability and/or 
enable a return to port. At this stage, escape routes can be based on the 
location and extent of the damage.  For example, the plan would avoid 
passages that were destroyed by the impact, avoid mustering stations 
where life rafts have been destroyed, would limit evacuation using routes 
needed by repair parties, etc. 
If the CO realizes the ship will inevitably be lost, he will finally order 
abandonment.  At that time, crewmembers are still required to conduct an emergency 
destruction of sensitive materials and equipment (Responsibility for National Security 
Cases, 2002), especially when sailing in enemy waters.  This process is carried out by 
specialized crewmembers and takes place concomitantly with other crewmembers 
transiting to mustering stations. 
These three opportunities will not necessarily be present in all cases: A naval ship 
may receive an impact without previous awareness (as with the USS COLE attack in 
2000) or the severity of the damage may require the immediate abandonment of the ship 




Figure 1.   Evacuation process for a naval ship and points at which a dynamic escape 
plan can be defined.  Blue triangles denote those points.  This example assumes 
that the ship has some warning of the impending impact of a weapon, hence the 
“awareness phase.” 
 
Travel or Muster time (T) is defined by IMO MSC/Circ. 1033 as the time it takes 
for “all persons” on board to move from where they are (upon notification) to the 
mustering stations. When arriving at the mustering stations, crewmembers embark onto 
rescue craft, which are then launched into the sea, or they jump into the water to board 
life-rafts.  The sum of the embarkation time (E) and launching time (L) defines the time 
required to provide for abandonment of the ship.  An additional, difficult-to-predict time 
(R) passes until rescue of these castaways is accomplished. 
Minimizing the transit time of evacuees to mustering stations is an obvious goal 
of any evacuation model.  However, we do not want to accelerate the ship’s sinking by 
opening more watertight doors than necessary and thus diminish the survival chances for 
crewmembers that might be delayed in their evacuation. Unfortunately, due to stealth 
design, modern naval ships have few exits to the outside, i.e., to the main deck (in some 
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cases, only two: forecastle and flight deck).  Thus, optimizing the flow of crewmembers 
as they evacuate a ship is even more important today than it was in the past. 
If ship integrity has highest priority (for example, so the ship has time to reach 
shallow water and be grounded for a later rescue), this can be accommodated in the 
objective function.  However, this specific scenario is not considered here. 
 
C. MODELING NAVAL-SHIP EVACUATION 
1. From Passenger-Ship Models To Naval-Ship Models 
Despite the differences between the naval-ship and passenger-ship evacuation 
problems, we first look at models from the civilian world to guide our modeling 
approach.  Mathematical models concerning human movement under emergency and 
non-emergency conditions have largely evolved since the work by Predtechenskii and 
Milinskii (1969).  This work provides walking-speed formulae as functions of density, for 
a civilian setting, and has been used widely to gain insight into the problem. 
The evacuation process for occupants of any structure, such as a building, aircraft, 
passenger ship or offshore platform, can be modeled using two basic approaches:  
1. An optimization model searches for “optimal” routes for evacuees, who 
are treated as a homogenous “commodity,” i.e., individual behavior is 
ignored.  These models are typically linear or nonlinear programs that may 
be viewed as network-flow models with side constraints (e.g., Chalmet et 
al., 1982).  Normally, the objective minimizes the average evacuation 
time, or some similar statistic. 
2. Discrete-event simulation models take individual movement and behavior 
into account, trying to realistically represent the paths and decisions made 
during the evacuation process.  Behavioral rules employed by the 
evacuees vary greatly (e.g. Exodus, 2004).  Clearly, optimizing the 
evacuation process is difficult to accomplish with such a model. Some 
models also incorporate “evacuation events” that affect the egress process, 
such as a person tripping, injured, etc. (e.g., Shetopal and Grubits, 1994.) 
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Because selecting the best possible escape routes requires optimization, we 
develop an optimization model of the ship-evacuation process that: 
• Incorporates many features that are ignored in models of building or 
passenger-ship evacuation, for example, the importance maintaining a 
naval ship’s integrity. 
• Adapts data regarding the walking speeds of evacuees to a homogeneous 
population (although it is still derived from data on building evacuations).  
• Directly incorporates the effects of impediments such as closed doors, 
blocked passageways and counter-movements of repair parties; no vague 
“safety factor” is used. 
• Does not assume that everybody evacuates via primary routes.  In fact, we 
calculate the best possible evacuation route for each “group” of 
crewmembers; a “group” is defined as all crewmembers occupying a given 
compartment or other location when the evacuation order is given.  
We recommend that future studies validate our assumptions by the means of 
simulation, at the individual level, to determine if random events, e.g., tripping, door-
opening times, are important. 
 
2. Overview Of The Optimization Model 
We model a naval ship evacuation by the means of a macroscopic optimization 
model.  The enclosure, i.e., ship, is represented using a sparse, directed network and the 
population is treated as a homogenous assembly (at least at the “group” level, see Chapter 
III for details).  The network is derived from technical and construction drawings, with 
(1) nodes representing compartments, closures and intersections, (2) arcs representing 
passages and stairways between nodes, (3) source nodes representing the compartments 
where crewmembers are initially located, and (4) muster nodes, connected to a super-sink 
node, representing mustering stations. 
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The model is a difficult-to-solve, nonlinear, mixed-integer program with an 
underlying network sub-structure.  The difficulty in solving the model arises from two 
factors: 
• The speed , ,g n ms  at which a group g of evacuees traverses an arc 
( )mna ,=  depends on the concurrent flow with other groups on the arc. 
• The first group to reach a closed closure will incur a delay nt , but 
subsequent groups will not directly incur that delay. 
The model seeks to minimize an objective function incorporating two goals: 
evacuation index T, and ship integrity index I. The evacuation index is the average 
evacuation time of all crewmembers, while the ship integrity index reflects the number of 
closures remaining open after the muster phase of the evacuation. These two objectives 
are, to some extent, in conflict with each other; for example, opening a watertight door 
may speed the access to a mustering station, but it may also degrade the ships integrity. 
(Remark: We assume that the first group that arrives at a closed closure will open it and it 
will remain open afterwards, even if other groups traverse the closure). 
As we explain in detail in Chapters II and III, the optimal solution to the problem 
is approximated by employing an iterative, heuristic algorithm that uses ideas similar to 
successive linear programming (e.g., Fletcher and Sainz, 1989).  At each iteration, we 
replace nonlinear terms by estimated coefficients, add constraints to eliminate counter-
flows that have been observed, and then solve the approximating mixed integer.  The new 
solution is used again to readjust nonlinear coefficients, new constraints are added if 
necessary, and the process is repeated until no more adjustments are necessary. 
 
D. THESIS OUTLINE 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II describes the 
mathematical details of our DER model for naval-ship evacuation. Chapter III explains 
the methodology used to solve the model approximately. Chapter IV describes the 
application of the model to a recently built frigate: Dynamic escape plans are compared 
to a static escape plan under diverse scenarios.  Conclusions are drawn in Chapter VII. 
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II.  MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter develops a nonlinear mixed-integer optimization model for DER.  
An underlying sparse network represents the enclosure; evacuees are treated 
“macroscopically,” i.e., as groups of crewmembers with identical attributes. 
The directed network is derived from technical and construction drawings: 
• Nodes N represent compartments, closures and intersections; 
• Arcs A represent passages and stairways; 
• Source nodes represent the compartments where crewmembers are 
initially located; and 
• “Muster nodes,” connected to a super-sink node, represent mustering 
stations. 
The occupants of each compartment are treated as a single commodity in a multi-
commodity flow model. The commodities are homogeneous except that all “members” of 
a commodity start at a common origin and are directed to a common (but initially 
unspecified) destination. Compartment occupancy at the time of the contingency 
represents supply of the commodity at the source nodes.  Mustering stations represent 
“elastic demand” nodes, in which the demand lies between limits based on the mustering 
station’s capacity.  To model this situation in a more standard fashion, these nodes are 
attached to a super-sink whose demand equals the total number of evacuees, and each 
connecting arc is given a capacity equaling that of the relevant mustering station.  We 
also assume that all crewmembers that are located in a single compartment will follow a 
unique evacuation route.  
Our model will be nonlinear because: 
• The speed mngs ,,  at which a group of evacuees g traverses an arc ( )mna ,=  
depends nonlinearly on the concurrent flow of crewmembers, in all groups, on 
that arc; and 
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• An “initial group” that must open a closure at node n incurs a delay nt , while 
subsequent groups do not. We adopt a conservative assumption that the closure is 
not closed again. 
The walking speed of pedestrians, under normal circumstances or during 
emergency egress, has been addressed by many authors like Predtetschenski and Milinski 
(1971), Fruin (1971) and Pauls (1988), but none of these authors has applied their work 
to a naval environment.  However, more recently, the Escape and Evacuation Naval 
Authority of the U.K. conducted trials on two naval ships and on a damage repair 
instructional unit (a mockup of a naval ship) (Boxal, 2005). The data collected is intended 
to be used in the ship-evacuation modeling software maritimeEXODUS (Exodus, 2004) 
and will likely contain more representative transit-speed estimates than the ones used in 
this thesis.  However, these data are not available at the time of our research, so we adopt 
the speed function recommended by the IMO for passenger ships (MSC/Circ 1033, 
2002), without any age or gender corrections; see Figure 2. The speed when traversing a 
trunk (vertical passage), not supplied by IMO, has been estimated. 






























Figure 2.   Walking speed of pedestrians as a function of flow (total number of 
persons per meter of passage section and second), in accordance with MSC/Circ. 
1033. 
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In accordance with IMO, the speed of evacuees is a function of: 
• The concurrent flow of persons traversing an arc (the number of escaping 
persons past a point in the escape route per unit time per unit of clear 
width of the route involved), 
• The type of arc (e.g. passage, companionway, trunk), and 
• The direction (upstairs, downstairs) 
The following sections of this chapter describe the model formulation and 
algorithm used. 
 
B. INDICES AND SETS OF INDICES 
Nn∈  Nodes, including an artificial super-sink node, denoted n+ 
Gg∈  Groups, where each group consists of crewmembers originally located at 
the same compartment node 
0
gn  Origin node for group g,  Nng ∈0    
NN M ⊂  Nodes representing mustering stations  
NN D ⊂  Nodes that require opening a closure for the first group that traverses the 
node (depends on the MCR of the ship) 
( , )a n m A= ∈  Arcs, including artificial arcs MNnfor  nna ∈= + ),,(  
C Set of indices for counter-flow constraints, defined as 
{( , ', , ) | , ' , ', ( , ) ,  and ( , ) }C g g n m g g G g g n m A n m m n A= ∈ ≠ ∈ < ∈
 
Remark: The heuristic solution procedure only builds a small subset of C, 





C. PARAMETERS [UNITS] 
nc  Capacity of muster node MNn∈  [no. of evacuees]
gv  Size of group g [no. of evacuees]
mnd ,  Length of arc ),( mna =  [meters]
 Remark: “Length” includes correction by a “permeability factor” when n 
is an origin node and if the group originating there traverses (n,m).  This 
factor is defined in section IV.B.5 
)(, FS mn  Speed function on arc )( m,na =  as a function of the 
total concurrent flow F on the arc (see Figure 2) 
[meters/second]
ntˆ  Time to open a closure at node DNn∈  
Remark: Depends on type of closure; see Table 3 
[seconds]
nγ  Non-negative objective-function weight for closure at node DNn∈ , if 
any 
 Remark: The contribution to ship integrity of closure at node n depends 
on the type of closure and is normalized by the total number of initially 
closed closures for the specific type, which depends on the MCR 
βα ,  Objective-function weights for trade-off between 
evacuation time and ship integrity, respectively 
[weight units]
t  Reference value used in the objective function for 
normalizing the evacuation time index 
[seconds]
 Remark: We use t = 300 seconds as the “target” based on the standard 
duration of the emergency escape breathing devices (EEBD) 
r “Resolution parameter” used for deciding whether or 
not two groups traverse an arc concurrently 
[seconds]
 Remark: We use r=5 seconds 
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D. DECISION VARIABLES 
mngf ,,  1 if group g traverses arc ),( mna = , and 0 otherwise. 
mngs ,,  Speed of group g while traversing arc ),( mna =  
(see Figure 3) 
[m/s]
mngt ,,  Time when group g starts traversing arc  
),( mna = , if it does, and 0 otherwise 
[seconds]
ngy ,  1 if group g is the first group crossing a closed closure DNn∈ , and 0 
otherwise 
T Evacuation index, calculated as the average evacuation time normalized by 
the reference time, t  
I Ship integrity index 
Z Weighed objective function 
 
E. OBJECTIVE FUNCTION AND CONSTRAINTS 
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 (5) 1,',,, ≤+ nmgmng ff                                                   ( , ', , )g g n m C∀ ∈  
 (6) { }1,0, ,,, ∈ngmng yf                                                    AmnNnGg ∈∈∈∀ ),(,,  
 
(7) ( ) χ∈ yt s f ,,,  
where χ defines, in implicit form, the relationship among decision vectors 
f, s ,t, and y as follows: 
• (7.a) Let GgNn D ∈∈ , .  Then,  
 
{ }', , ', ,
'
,
1 if argmin | 1, ' , ( , )
0 otherwise.                                                            
g n m g n m
g
g n
g t f g G n m A
y
⎧ = = ∈ ∈⎪= ⎨⎪⎩
 
• (7.b) Let ( ) ( )kkk mnmn ,, = , k=1,2,…Kg, be the ordered sequence of consecutive 



























































• (7.c) For each ( ) Gg and Amn ∈∈,  such that fg,n,m=1: 
Let { }, , , , ', ,' |g n m g n m g n mG g G t t r= ∈ − < , be the subset of groups concurrent 




' g n m




= ∑  be the total flow (number of evacuees) concurrent 
with group g to traverse arc (n,m). 






The model formulated above is a nonlinear mixed-integer optimization model, 
with an underlying network sub-structure, which seeks to minimize an objective function 
based on two weighted goals reflected by the evacuation index T, and ship integrity index 
I. 
Constraint (1) calculates the evacuation index T, as the average evacuation time 
over all the groups, normalized by the reference time t . The evacuation for a single 
group is that group’s transit time from the origin node to the sink node, plus any 
additional time required to open closed closures it reaches before any other group.  
Constraint (2) calculates the ship integrity index I as the weighted integrity lost by 
closures of each type opened by the evacuees, normalized by the initial number of closed 
closures. Weights account for the level of watertight and airtight degradation that the 
opened closure causes to the ship. More degradation implies a higher weight. Door data, 
including weights and opening times, are specified in Appendix D. 
Constraints (3) are the balance constraints for all groups and nodes. These 
constraints ensure that all the evacuees leave their respective origin nodes (sources) and 
reach some mustering station (which is connected to the super-sink). 
Constraints (4) limit the number of evacuees that can reach a mustering station, 
based on the availability and capacity of the boats and life-rafts at each station. 
Constraints (5) prohibit counter-flows, i.e., two groups moving in opposite 
directions on any arc. Counter-flows are unacceptable since escape signs should only 
point in one direction: Once configured, escape signs remain fixed during the whole 
evacuation process, and do not vary based on which group is traversing the arc. These 
constraints do not prevent two groups arriving at a node from departing in different 
directions, however. This may be a reasonable property if the groups arrive from different 
directions because they would see different signs, but is a model limitation otherwise. 
(Remark: None of our cases exhibits problems in this regard, but, if needed, this situation 
could be explicitly avoided by adding constraints and binary variables that would force a 
unique forward direction of travel sign at each junction). 
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Constraints (6) ensure flows and closure openings are binary decision variables. 
Equation (7.a) determines whether or not a group is the first one traversing a node 
with a closed door. 
Equation (7.b) calculates the time at which a given group starts traversing a given 
arc.  
 Equation (7.c) calculates the speed at which a given group traverses an arc, based 
on the approximate number of evacuees that share that arc during the same time interval.  
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III. SOLUTION METHODOLOGY 
A. DESCRIPTION 
We approximate the optimal solution to (P) by employing an iterative heuristic 
algorithm that uses ideas similar to successive linear programming (e.g., Fletcher and 
Sainz, 1989). In each iteration we replace (P) by an approximating mixed-integer linear 
problem. In essence, the approximating problem replaces non-linear terms (such as 
1/sg,n,m in the objective function) and non-explicit constraints (such as those arising from 
relationships in (7)) by approximated values derived from a post-process of the tentative 
solution to a previous approximating problem. We also ignore counter-flow constraints 
and only add to the approximating problem those needed in order to avoid inconsistencies 
in intermediate solutions. Newly generated solutions are used again to readjust terms for 
the next approximating problem, and the process is repeated until no more adjustments 
are necessary. Unlike standard sequential linear programming, we neither add penalty 
terms nor enforce trust regions. This has not been necessary, at least in our computational 
experience, for the process to converge, reasonably quickly, to a feasible solution. The 
procedure is formally defined here: 




ng NnGgy ∈∈∀= ,,0:ˆ 0,  
( ) ( )0, , ,ˆ : , , ,g n m n m gs S v g G n m A= ∀ ∈ ∈  
∅=:0C  
0: CC =   (set of counter-flow valid inequalities) 














 where (5) is only applied to elements in the updated set C 
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and (8) – (9) are as follows: 
(8) ( ), , , ,ˆ , , ,ig n m g n ms s g G n m A= ∀ ∈ ∈  
(9) ( ), , , ,ˆ, , , , | 1D ig n g n m g ny f g G n N n m A y≥ ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈ =  
Assume )( iP yields , , ,i i i iZf s y    
Step 2 
Post-Process 
(2.a) Compute all i mngt ,,ˆ  using (7.b) and update 
i
mngs ,,ˆ and 
i
ngy ,ˆ with values consistent with (7.a)-(7.c).  See details 
below. 
Calculate the adjusted iZˆ . 
If updates on i mngs ,,ˆ and 
i
ngy ,ˆ are made, set 
      changes := true 
otherwise set 
      changes := false 
 (2.b) Update counter-flow set for the next iteration: 
( ){ }1 , , ', ,: , ', , | 1i i i ig n m g m nC C g g n m f f+ = ∪ ⋅ =  
1: += iCC  
Step 3 
Convergence 
 If changes := false and ii CC =+ :1  then STOP: 
A heuristic solution has been found: ( )ˆ ˆˆ ˆ, , ,i i i if s t y . 
The objective value for this solution is iZˆ , and a bound 
on the best possible solution is Z0. 
Otherwise, set i:= i+1 and return to Step 1. 
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The updates in the post-process step constitute the algorithm’s foundation.  Since 
we do not know, a priori, the number of crewmembers that will traverse an arc, we 
initiate the algorithm by setting the speed of any group g traversing an arc a=(n,m) to the 
maximum possible speed, ( ), ,n m n m gs S v=  (see Figure 3). This assumes there is no other 
concurrent group at the time g traverses the arc, i.e., it is an optimistic assumption. We 
also set to zero all the decision variables ngy , , i.e., we assume the group encounters all 
closures open. Under these “ideal” conditions the objective value obtained after this first 
iteration, 0Z , is a lower bound on the optimal solution to (P). 
As soon as the solution to problem (P0) is available, a post-process determines: 
• Concurrent flow: groups that traverse the same arc near-simultaneously, 
under these “ideal” conditions; 
• Counter flow: groups that traverse an arc in opposite directions; 
• First group to open a closure. 
To account for these aspects we must calculate the actual time at which each 
group traverses an arc and/or reaches a node on its way to a mustering station. Our static 
network fails to capture the dynamic nature of our problem. Ford and Fulkerson (1958) 
proposed transforming a static network into a dynamic one by replication, leading to 
well-known “time-phased networks.” However, such a network would notably increase 
our model’s size, yet it would not completely eliminate the nonlinearity associated with 
the concurrent flow on the arcs. Our approach post-calculates the time at which each 
group traverses nodes and arcs on its route by backtracking from the mustering station to 
the origin node. 
We assume that two groups, g and 'g g≠ , that are traversing an arc a = (n,m) 
constitute a near-simultaneous flow if the following conditions arise:  
, , ', , ', , ' , ,andg n m g n m g m p g m pt t t t< < , 
where p is the next node in the path for group g and 'p  is the same for 'g . 
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This calculation is performed incrementally for all groups traversing every arc. 
Each group’s speed is calculated in (7.c) based on the total flow (number of evacuees) 
concurrent with group g to traverse arc (n,m). 
Two or more groups of crewmembers may cross a closure but only one can be the 
first one (identified as in (7.a)) to open that closure. The heuristic scheme accounts for 
this fact by charging the “first group” with a delay in the objective function should the 
group persist to use that closure at the next iteration (constraint (9)). 
Finally, the post-process analyzes possible counter-flows. Counter-flows are 
unacceptable because, once configured, escape-route signs remain fixed during the whole 
evacuation process; they do not vary based on which group is traversing an arc. Since, in 
practice, the majority of counter-flow constraints (5) will be inactive, we only enforce 
them as needed. 
Iterations continue until the following two conditions are met: 
• There is no significant variation between the values produced by the 
simplified model, ,i is y , and the post-processed values, ˆ ˆ,i is y . 











Figure 3.   Representative walking speed as a function of concurrent flow on arc 
(n,m). A minimum speed ε is used to avoid by-zero divisions. Initially, the 
algorithm uses the maximum possible speed for a group g of size vg. When total 
concurrent flow, Fg,n,m , on the arc is realized, speed is updated. 
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IV. CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The DER model introduced in the previous chapter has been evaluated on a 
recently built 5,800 Ton frigate, the F-101 ÁLVARO DE BAZÁN (see Figure 4). This is 
the first of four medium-sized multi-purpose frigates ordered by the Spanish Navy and 
built by Izar shipyard. The last of these frigates is expected to be commissioned in 2007. 
  
Figure 4.   F-101 ÁLVARO DE BAZÁN. 
The main particulars of this class are: 
• Propulsion: Two General Electric LM 2500 gas turbines, two caterpillar 
3600 diesel engines  
• Shafts:  2  
• Length:  147 m 
• Beam:   18.6 m 
• Draught:  4.75 m   
• Displacement: 5,802 tons full load  
• Speed:  29+ knots  
• Range:  5,000 nm 
• Crew:   245 (35 officers) 
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Ships are designed and built using technical drawings or “blueprints” created with 
computer-aided design software, and various versions of the drawings are created as the 
ship goes through the design process. The network used for DER modeling in this thesis 




Figure 5.   Building the DER network for the ÁLVARO DE BAZÁN from technical 













Our DER network has 639 nodes representing compartments, closures, 
intersections and mustering stations on seven decks, three below the main deck, and three 
above it (Table 2). 
Below Main Deck Number of Nodes Above Main Deck Number of Nodes 
Deck 4 41 Level 01 64 
Deck 3 124 Level 02 41 
Deck 2 233 Level 03 3 
Deck 1 (Main Deck) 133   
Table 2. Number of nodes per deck or level. 
We collect all relevant information from technical drawings and consolidate it in 
an Excel spreadsheet (Figure 6), which also allows us to implement embedded 
validations in order to avoid clerical errors. Node attributes are as follows: 
• Node ID: a unique identifier of the node; 
• Name: node description; 
• Type: For example, watertight door; 
• MCR Mark: Used to determine if a closure is initially closed or not, 
depending on the relevant MCR; 
• “X,Y,Z” Coordinates: Node location with respect to a Cartesian reference 
system; 
• Supply: Number of crewmembers, if any, originally located at the node for 
each possible situation (general quarters, watch and port) 






Figure 6.   Node data sheet. Information relative to network nodes is consolidated in a 
spreadsheet 
1. Node ID 
Node ID contains four components: deck number, station number, side number 
and usage letter. This convention is similar to the Compartment Designation Numbering 
System (CDNS) which was established and has been in use by the U.S. Navy since 1949 
(Compartment Letters for Ships, 2005). Those who are familiar with the CDNS can 
easily identify a node and locate its position onboard. This convention is explained in 
detail in Appendix C. 
 
2. Type 
The nodes of the DER network represent one of the following: 
a. Compartments 
The ship is divided into compartments by means of horizontal divisions 
called “decks,” and vertical divisions, which can run transversely or longitudinally, called 
“bulkheads.” Watertight bulkheads are spaced at appropriate intervals and extend from 
the keel to the main deck and from side to side. Some bulkheads and decks have the 
important mission of guaranteeing the floatability of the ship when damage occurs or are 
built to ensure adequate structural strength. Compartments are important to our model 
because we assume crewmembers are located in these berthing compartments, repair 
stations, magazines, the combat information center, the bridge, etc. Some other 





















              101 110 62 
2-215-4-T2 T2 Null Trunk 129.00 -2.28 7.781 0 0 0 
2-214-2-WTD WTD Y Fore Peak 128.00 -1.50 7.754 0 0 0 
2-211-0-E Source Null Windlass Room 126.83 0.00 7.722 16 8 0 
2-209-2-WTS WTS X Scuttle 125.38 -1.54 7.683 0 0 0 
2-208-2-WTD WTD X Subdivision 124.80 -2.92 7.668 0 0 0 
2-203-4-T T Null Access Trunk 121.83 -3.44 7.587 0 0 0 
2-203-2-D NTD X Non Tight Door 121.82 -2.81 7.587 0 0 0 
2-202-1-C2 C2 Null Repair Station #6 120.89 0.96 7.562 16 0 0 
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rarely visited, such as stores; we ignore such compartments when building the DER 
network. 
The number of people occupying a compartment is variable and depends 
on the condition ordered by the commanding officer, which is uniquely defined in the 
shipboard organization book. This topic will be addressed in paragraph 5 below. 
 
b. Closures 
For the purpose of this study, we reduce the number of closure types to 
seven. (See Appendix D for a detailed discussion of types of closures that can be found 
onboard of naval ships.). Heavier closures are more difficult to open than lighter ones. 
We estimate the time required to open each type of closure as indicated in Table 3. The 
ordered MCR dictates which closures are initially opened or closed (see Table 1). 
 
Table 3. Estimated time to open a closure by the first group of evacuees. 
 
c. Mustering Stations 
Muster nodes represent mustering stations, which are the locations 
onboard where the crew assembles and waits for the order to embark on life-rafts. A 
Type Symbol Time to Open 
  (seconds) 
Watertight Door WTD 20 
Watertight Hatch WTH 30 
Watertight Scuttle WTS 25 
Airtight Door ATD 10 
Airtight Hatch ATH 15 
Airtight Scuttle ATS 10 
Non-tight Door NTD 5 
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mustering station has a limited capacity that depends on the number of life-rafts mounted 
in its vicinity. We assume ÁLVARO DE BAZÁN has three mustering stations, the 
forecastle, flight deck and boat deck, as shown in Figure 7.   
 
Figure 7.   Mustering stations on the ÁLVARO DE BAZÁN. 
The mustering station on the boat deck is limited to 36 people because this 
is the maximum capacity of the two rigid-hull inflatable life-boats situated on this deck. 
The rest of the crew musters on the forecastle and the flight deck with some flexibility: 
We allow at most 65% of the crew to muster at either station. This assumption needs to 
be further validated and checked against the actual distribution of life-rafts. 
 
3. Material Condition Of Readiness 
The MCR dictates whether or not a closure is initially open. A full description can 
be found in the Appendix A. 
 
4. Coordinates 
Coordinates X, Y, Z represent the position of the node with respect to the 
specified coordinate system. We adopt the standard coordinate system where the origin is 
the intersection of the aft perpendicular (AP), baseline (BL) and centerline (CL) (see 
Figure 8). The baseline is used as the longitudinal axis, the x-axis of the system of 
coordinates in which nodes are defined, and it is positive moving forward. The y-axis is 
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transversal and positive to starboard. The z-axis is vertical and positive upwards. This 
coordinate system is different from the system used in the United States, where the origin 
















Figure 8.   Coordinate reference system for the ÁLVARO DE BAZÁN. 
 
5. Source Nodes 
The initial distribution of crewmembers across compartments depends on the 
crew distribution ordered and is uniquely determined by the ship’s organization book. 
Each member of a naval ship crew is assigned to a unique station for each situation. 
Battle bills, i.e., the lists of stations that must be manned during battle and other 
conditions, vary among the world’s navies, naval ship classes and doctrines. However, 
they usually cover two main categories: wartime and peacetime. Each category 
subdivides into conditions I to V, which are ordered by the CO. Of all the possible 
conditions for our frigate, we select the following three crew distributions as most 
representative: 
• General Quarters: equivalent to Condition I. The ship is in battle 
condition and all crewmembers are located at their combat stations. 
• Watch: equivalent to Conditions III and IV. We assume that one third of 
the crew is located in control and weapons stations, one third is resting in 
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their cabins and the remaining third is working in offices or relaxing in 
living rooms. 
• Port: All crewmembers but the guard are resting in their cabins or 
berthing rooms. This is a plausible scenario, especially at night and when 
harbored in a non-home port. 
A detailed table of crew distribution can be found in the Appendix B. Table 4 





(no. of crew) 
Watch      
(no. of crew)
Port         
(no. of crew) 
4 20 9 0 
3 5 59 167 
2 101 110 62 
1 34 23 14 
01 59 32 0 
02 20 9 2 
03 6 3 0 
Table 4. Crew distribution by deck and condition on the ÁLVARO DE BAZÁN. 
 
By the above, we assume that we know the exact number of crewmembers in a 
compartment. However, we do not know their exact positions within the compartment. 
For simplicity, we account for this by using a correction factor, called “permeability,” 
which increases the distance from the center of the compartment to the exit, based on 
how difficult it is to exit the compartment for evacuees: For example, engine rooms are 






The DER network for the ÁLVARO DE BAZÁN contains 1,435 arcs 
representing passages, trunks and companionways. 
Crewmembers move from one compartment to another on the same deck through 
passages whenever the deck is not interrupted by a watertight bulkhead. Passages on 
naval ships, where aesthetical considerations are neglected, differ from corridors on 
passenger ships: They tend to be narrower and full of equipment. Companionways, or 
ladders, lead from one deck level to another, and some of them require opening a hatch.  
Escape trunks, as shown in Figure 9 are direct connections between lower 
compartments like engine rooms and the main deck. They are accessible through a 
watertight door and have special bars to facilitate climbing. 
 
Figure 9.   Looking down an escape trunk. 
The following information is collected from technical drawings for our ship 
(Figure 10): 
• Width is the horizontal measure taken perpendicular to the length of the 
arc; 
• Permeability, increments the Cartesian distance between a node 
representing a compartment and the exit node based on the difficulty to 
find the exit of the space;  
• Type, represents the kind of arc. We consider five types of arcs: passages, 
engine-room corridors, companionways, escape trunks (which lead 
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upward from the engine room) and vertical trunks. The speed of 
crewmembers when traversing an arc depends on the type of arc, among 
other factors.  
• Activity, takes the value 1 if the arc can be used (for example, it is not 
blocked by fire) and 0 otherwise; this is a control field and it is not 
explicitly derived from the blue prints. 
n m Active Width Perm Type
1-150-3-T 1-147-1-T 1 1.65 1.000 T
1-147-1-T 1-150-3-T 1 1.65 1.000 T
1-157-1-T 1-157-2-T 1 1.20 1.000 T
1-157-2-T 1-157-1-T 1 1.20 1.000 T
1-161-1-C2 1-158-2-D 0 100 1.070 T
1-158-2-D 1-161-1-C2 1 100 1.070 T
1-158-2-D 1-157-2-T 1 0.66 1.000 T
1-157-2-T 1-158-2-D 0 0.66 1.000 T
1-157-2-T 1-157-4-T 1 1.20 1.000 T
1-157-4-T 1-157-2-T 1 1.20 1.000 T  
 
Figure 10.   Arc data. 
 
Some models (Pauls, 1984), including ours, use the “effective” width of the arc 
instead of the total width. In order to accommodate lateral body sway and assure balance, 
persons moving through the escape routes must maintain some clearance from walls 
and/or other fixed items (e.g., handrails, fixed seats, etc.). The effective width of an arc is 
the clear width, i.e., the width after being reduced by the sum of the clearances. For the 
naval-ship problem, we adjust for structural elements such as stiffeners or beams to 




V. TEST SCENARIOS 
A. SCENARIO OVERVIEW  
Naval ships such as the ÁLVARO DE BAZÁN are complex vessels intended for 
many different missions. Anticipating all possible scenarios leading to evacuation is 
impossible. Consequently, we limit our analysis to demonstrate the benefits of employing 
DER to a subset of select scenarios, each defined by three factors: 
• Crew Distribution: General Quarters, Watch or Port, 
• Material Condition: ZEBRA, YOKE or XRAY, and 
• Damage: Ship damage (if any). 
First, escape routes are configured during the normal operation phase, even before 
any threat is known or damage has taken place. Accordingly, we start analyzing the most 
significant scenarios where the ship remains intact (Table 5). Even in the absence of 
external damage to the ship, an evacuation may be required, for example, because of fire 
in the engine room. 
  Crew distribution 
  General 
Quarters 
Watch Port 
ZEBRA Yes No No 
YOKE No Yes No 
Material 
Condition 
XRAY No No Yes 
Table 5. Intact-ship scenarios: Three cases analyzed. 
Together, the general-quarters crew distribution and ZEBRA MCR represent a 
scenario in which all crewmembers are at their combat stations and the ship has most of 
its closures shut. On the other hand, a port and XRAY condition has most of the crew 
resting in cabins and berthing, and the ship integrity is most relaxed. (Crew distributions 
and doors initially closed by MCR are specified in Appendices B and D, respectively.) 
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Second, we adapt our data to represent ship-damage scenarios: Speed is reduced 
on partially blocked arcs (for example, on arcs used by damage parties or filled with 
smoke). Impassable arcs (for example, those destroyed by fire after the impact of a 
missile) are explicitly removed from the network. We assume damage scenarios for our 
frigate similar to those experienced by the USS STARK and the USS COLE. 
Finally, we demonstrate the utility of our model during the design stage by 
analyzing two design alternatives: an additional forecastle exit and an increased passage 
width. 
In all scenarios, our DRE model (P) assumes maximum physical capacities at the 
mustering stations based on life-raft availability. Unless otherwise specified, we assume a 
maximum capacity of 119 crewmembers (65% of the total crew) at either the forecastle 
or the flight deck stations, whereas the boat deck station has a fixed capacity of 36 
crewmembers. (Our model could be used during the design phase of the ship to determine 
a life-raft distribution that accommodates a flexible DER, but for now we assume that the 
capacities are as given.)  
The weights α and β  used in the model’s objective function are based on the 
relative importance given to evacuation time T and ship integrity I, respectively. In all the 
cases studied, we assume that are α = 2/3 and β = 1/3. Thus, our objective Z (to be 
minimized) is the compound index Z=2/3 T + 1/3 I. We compare the values of T, I and Z 
(among other parameters) for DER and static routes. Static routes are emulated in our 
model by fixing the fg,n,m variables in accordance with the technical drawings for our 
frigate. More specifically, we disable transit in a direction that conflicts with the static 
sign whose direction is given in the drawings. 
In the remainder of this chapter we show computational results for each of the 
above scenarios. The heuristic algorithm presented in Chapter II has been implemented 
using the XPress optimization suite (Dash, 2004), in Mosel 1.4.1 language, with 
Optimizer version 15.25.03 as the solver, on a Dell Inspiron 8600 Pentium M computer 
running at 1.6 GHz with 512 Mb of random access memory. This software has a 
graphical environment to display results on the computer screen, but with limited 
capabilities. Therefore, we have created also created a schematic representation of the 
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most important decks (Decks 1 and 2 and Level 01) using Microsoft Visio (Microsoft, 
2003). 
 
B. INTACT-SHIP SCENARIOS 
Table 6 shows that DER improves the evacuation index by between 19% and 26% 
in the intact-ship scenarios. These improvements result from improvements in both 
evacuation time and ship integrity (Table 7). 
 General Quarters Watch Port 
 Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic
Objective Index Z 0.579 0.428 0.455 0.339 0.326 0.262 
Improvement  26.1%  25.5%  19.6% 
Table 6. Objective-function comparison for intact ship scenarios. 
 
Average evacuation time following DER is up to 20% less than when using static 
signs. The improvement is not as significant under the general-quarters scenario, which 
may indicate that the static escape routes have been planned for this condition. 
The time of the last group of evacuees, calculated by post-processing the solution, 
is also up to 30% less using DER. This result is, to some extent, unexpected, because our 
model does not attempt to minimize this value explicitly. (Remark: Table 7 also specifies 
the original location of last the group of evacuees. Our labeling convention follows 
standard nomenclature that is explained in Appendix C.) 
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 General Quarters Watch Port 
 Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic 
Mean Evac. Time 
(sec) 
64 57 70 59 70 56 
Improvement  10.9%  15.7%  20.0% 
Time Last Group 
(sec) 
143 106 131 106 115 80 
Improvement  25.9%  19.1%  30.4% 




Table 7. Evacuation time comparison for intact-ship scenarios.  
The ship integrity is also enhanced by using DER (Table 8): The watertight index 
of the ship is improved by opening, in some cases, up to 20 watertight doors fewer (25%) 
than in the static case. The airtight index is also improved. 
The improvements over static routes are achieved by changing the direction of 
select escape signs. Figures 11-13 depict these changes on schematics of Deck 1, Deck 2 
and Level 01. White arrows indicate escape signs for static routes that have changed the 
direction, while green arrows are those that remain invariable. Solid dots represent closed 
closures and dimmed dots represent those closures that were opened in the static case but 
remain closed for the dynamic case.  
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 General Quarters Watch Port 
 Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic 
Watertight Index 0.394 0.284 0.440 0.178 0.040 0.022 
Improvement  27.9%  59.5%  45.0% 
Airtight Index 0.392 0.317 0.330 0.302 0.061 0.060 
Improvement  19.1%  8.5%  1.6% 
 Number of closures: opened by the evacuees / initially closed 
Watertight Doors 79/87 59/87 68/75 55/75 21/47 12/47 
Watertight Hatches 20/22 19/22 19/22 19/22 0/1 0/1 
Watertight Scuttles 14/23 4/23 17/23 4/23 6/23 0/23 
Airtight Doors 37/46 32/46 42/46 31/46 0/0 0/0 
Airtight Hatches 5/6 6/6 6/6 5/6 0/0 0/0 
Non-tight Doors 21/91 11/91 73/85 68/85 65/85 61/85 
Table 8. Ship integrity comparison for intact-ship scenarios. 
Finally, Table 9 summarizes the total number of crewmembers that muster at each 
of the three assembly stations.  
 General Quarters Watch Port 
 Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic 
Flight Deck 73 91 118 132 145 141 
Boat Deck 35 35 36 36 7 20 
Forecastle 137 119 91 77 93 84 




We notice that the total numbers of evacuees by mustering station are similar in 
the port scenario for both static and dynamic routes. In the general-quarters and watch 




Figure 11.   Comparing dynamic and static escape routes for intact-ship scenarios and 





































Finally, we observe a clear preference of the crewmembers manning engine 
rooms to evacuate using escape trunks: In the general-quarters and watch scenarios, all 
crewmembers exit the engine rooms by escape trunks, which is a desirable outcome. 
Escape trunks play an important role in the evacuation process because they offer a fast 
and protected egress from spaces located in lower decks, without significant watertight 
degradation. They may also protect evacuees against fire and smoke. Remark: Escape 
trunks in naval ships may be viewed similarly to protected elevators in high buildings 
(Pauls, 2005). 
 
C. DAMAGED-SHIP SCENARIOS 
“Damaged-ship scenarios” are characterized by a damage location and the extent 
to which passages and closures are disabled. Damage-control (repair) parties play an 
important role in these scenarios because they are responsible for salvaging the ship 
and/or recovering its combat capability. All ships have at least one damage-control repair 
station (DCRS), but three or more is common on large ships. DCRSs are strategically 
located throughout the ship; they contain equipment used by repair parties and serve as 
control points for those parties. 
From the point of view of our DER model, we are interested in facilitating the 
tasks of repair parties, especially by avoiding counter-flow of evacuees through the 
passages that lead repair parties to damaged areas. Of course, we also wish to avoid flow 
in the same direction, if possible. In any case, the use by evacuees of passages required 
by repair parties is penalized by decreasing the evacuees’ walking speed with respect to 
that given by our baseline speed functions Sn,m(F). 
Next, we analyze two examples of damage to our case-study frigate. The damage 
scenarios are based on two recent attacks on the U.S. frigates, USS STARK and USS 
COLE. 
1. USS STARK Case 
We consider a scenario in which our frigate receives an impact similar to that 
received by the USS STARK in 1991 (Wikipedia, 2005). We make these additional 
hypotheses to build the scenario:  
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• Crew Distribution: General Quarters or Watch. (“Port” does not apply because 
the USS STARK was at sea at the time of the attack.) 
• Material Condition: ZEBRA or YOKE, respectively. (The XRAY condition 
does not apply because the USS STARK was engaged in war operations at the 
time of the attack.)  
• Damage: Passages and closures located on Decks 2, 1 and Level 01, on the 
bow port side, are made impassable. Passages from the Repair Station #5 to 
the damaged area are discouraged by significantly reducing the walking speed 
of evacuees traversing these arcs.  
Compared to static escape routes, the DER improves the evacuation-process index 
by approximately 25% in both scenarios; see Table 10. The mean evacuation time is 
reduced by 9% or 20%, depending on the scenario. Ship integrity, which is key in this 
scenario, is not compromised; in fact, just the opposite occurs: The level of integrity 
improves significantly, 47% or 60%. However, the static-route solution is 10% better 
than the dynamic solution with respect to the evacuation time for the last group of 
evacuees under the general-quarters scenario. This can be attributed to the fact that the 
DER model does not optimize the time of the last evacuee. Nonetheless, for the watch 
scenario, the time of the last evacuee is significantly better (32%) using DER. 
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 General Quarters Watch 
 Static Dynamic Static Dynamic 
Objective Index 0.588 0.454 0.529 0.393 
Improvement  22.8%  25.7% 
Mean Evacuation Time (sec) 66 60 87 70 
Improvement  9.1%  19.5% 
Time of Last Group (sec) 143 158 397 270 
Improvement  -10.5%  32.0% 
Watertight Index 0.568 0.300 0.470 0.190 
Improvement  47.2%  59.6% 
Airtight Index 0.404 0.373 0.352 0.346 
Improvement  7.7%  1.7% 
 Number of closures: opened by the evacuees / initially closed 
Watertight Doors 76/87 55/87 67/75 51/75 
Watertight Hatches 20/22 19/22 19/22 19/22 
Watertight Scuttles 15/23 4/23 16/23 4/23 
Airtight Doors 37/46 32/46 42/46 31/46 
Airtight Hatches 6/6 6/6 6/6 5/6 
Non-tight Doors 21/91 11/91 73/85 67/85 
Table 10. Objective-function, evacuation-time and ship-integrity comparisons for 




Figure 14.   Comparing dynamic and static escape routes for the damaged-ship 
scenario: USS STARK case, watch condition. The shaded area represents the 
damaged zone and green passages are used by the repair parties. 
Figure 14 depicts escape routes for a watch-condition scenario. The shaded area 
represents the damaged zone. Arcs inside this area are made impassable. A thick green 
line represents the passages used by repair parties to reach the damaged area. As in the 
previous section, white arrows represent escape signs that differ from those drawn from 
current static routes. 
2. USS COLE Case 
In this scenario, we assume that our frigate is moored (port side to pier) and a 
significant explosion occurs amidships, close to the waterline. This scenario represents a 
situation similar to that experienced by the USS COLE in 2000 (Wikipedia, 2005), 
although the COLE was not moored, but anchored in a supposedly “friendly” port at the 
time of the attack. Two important facts characterize this case: 
• Most of the crew is resting on the lower decks. 
• Only one ladder, on the flight deck, is available to reach the pier. 
Level 01 
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For obvious reasons, the only crew distribution analyzed in this scenario is Port, 
and the material condition is XRAY. 
Under these assumptions, it is reasonable to expect that the majority of the crew 
would evacuate the ship by trying to reach the pier, and thus using the ladder situated on 
the flight deck. To model this scenario, we modify the capacity of the forecastle 
mustering station to 10% of the total crew (instead of the 65% assumed in other 
scenarios) and increase the capacity of the flight deck to 100%. This forces most of the 
crew to head towards the flight deck from their berthing rooms situated on Decks 3 and 2. 
We assume it is impossible to lower the boats, so we set the capacity of the boat deck to 
zero.  
Repair parties will try to control flooding by pumping water through the escape 
trunk on the port side of the damaged engine room, as represented by the solid pink dot in 
Figure 15.   
DER improves the evacuation process by 23% over the static plan, by reducing 
the mean evacuation time by 30 seconds and by keeping five more watertight doors 
closed. The time of the last evacuee also improves. DER take advantage of known usable 




 Static Dynamic 
Objective Index 0.471 0.349 
Improvement  22.8% 
Mean Evacuation Time (sec) 108 78 
Improvement  9.1% 
Time of Last Group (sec) 507 108 
Improvement  -10.5% 
Watertight Index 0.052 0.027 
Improvement  47.2% 
Airtight Index 0.062 0.059 
Improvement  7.7% 
Number of closures:  
opened by the evacuees / initially closed 
Watertight Doors 18/47 13/47 
Watertight Hatches 0/1 0/1 
Watertight Scuttles 5/23 0/23 
Airtight Doors 0/0 0/0 
Airtight Hatches 0/0 0/0 
Non-tight Doors 65/85 62/85 
Table 11. Objective function, evacuation time and ship integrity comparison for 




Figure 15.   Comparing dynamic and static escape routes for damaged-ship scenario, 
USS COLE case, port condition. 
 
D. DESIGN ASPECTS 
Naval architects must demonstrate the effectiveness of a ship’s evacuation system 
during the early steps of the design process, when important changes do not have a 
serious budget impact. In theory, our DER model can be used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of various design alternatives. To demonstrate this possibility, we consider 
the following design modifications to the ÁLVARO DE BAZÁN: 
• Add a watertight door to the forecastle, on the port side: The advantage of 
a second exit to the forecastle is obvious if one side is damaged, as 
occurred with the USS Stark. This modification would create a natural exit 
for the port passage. 
• Increase the widths of passages, doors and stairs by 10%, in order to allow 
higher walking speeds when concurrent flow occurs. This modification is 
Level 01 
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always possible, in theory, but would require that a ship’s dimensions be 
increased if compartments were to remain the same size.  
We explore the new designs under the intact-ship scenarios. Results are presented 
in Tables 15-17 and Figure 6.  
The addition of a new exit to the forecastle does not significantly improve mean 
evacuation time, mainly because few evacuees use that exit. This alternative would be 
more important in a damage case like the USS STARK attack, where a redundant exit 
could be used. In fact, if the exit to the forecastle (on the starboard side) were to become 
impassable, the ÁLVARO DE BAZÁN could not be completely evacuated with its 
current design. 
Increasing all passage widths by 10% improves the mean evacuation time, 
especially for the watch scenario: The improved routes are 38% better than static escape 
routes and 13% better than the optimized routes without design changes. We caution the 
reader that these results require further experimentation and validation because they 




 General Quarters 
 Static Dynamic Forecastle Width 
Objective Index 0.579 0.428 0.419 0.390 
Improvement  26.1% 27.6% 32.6% 
Mean Evacuation Time 64 57 57 47 
Improvement  10.9% 10.9% 25.6% 
Time of Last Group 143 106 116 93 
Improvement  25.9% 18.9% 35.0% 
Watertight Index 0.394 0.284 0.270 0.258 
Improvement  27.9% 31.5% 34.5% 
Airtight Index 0.392 0.317 0.315 0.228 
Improvement  19.1% 19.6% 41.8% 
 Number of closures opened by evacuees/initially closed 
Watertight Doors 79/87 59/87 59/89 59/89 
Watertight Hatches 20/22 19/22 19/22 19/22 
Watertight Scuttles 14/23 4/23 4/23 4/23 
Airtight Doors 37/46 32/46 31/46 32/46 
Airtight Hatches 5/6 6/6 6/6 6/6 
Non-tight Doors 21/91 11/91 11/91 11/91 
Table 12. Objective function, evacuation time and ship integrity comparison for 





 Static Dynamic Forecastle Width 
Objective Index 0.455 0.339 0.331 0.266 
Improvement  25.5% 27.2% 41.5% 
Mean Evacuation Time 70 59 57 43 
Improvement  15.7% 18.6% 38.6% 
Time of Last Group 131 106 124 104 
Improvement  19.1% 5.3% 20.6% 
Watertight Index 0.44 0.178 0.16 0.132 
Improvement  59.5% 63.6% 70.0% 
Airtight Index 0.33 0.302 0.357 0.258 
Improvement  8.5% -8.2% 21.8% 
 Number of closures opened by evacuees/initially closed 
Watertight Doors 68/75 55/75 56/77 55/75 
Watertight Hatches 19/22 19/22 19/22 19/22 
Watertight Scuttles 17/23 4/23 4/23 4/23 
Airtight Doors 42/46 31/46 33/46 32/46 
Airtight Hatches 6/6 5/6 5/6 5/6 
Non-tight Doors 73/85 68/85 68/85 68/85 
Table 13. Objective function, evacuation time and ship integrity comparison for 





 Static Dynamic Forecastle Width 
Objective Index 0.326 0.262 0.252 0.241 
Improvement  19.6% 22.7% 26.1% 
Mean Evacuation Time 70 56 55 38 
Improvement  20.0% 21.4% 45.7% 
Time of Last Group 115 80 90 79 
Improvement  30.4% 21.7% 31.3% 
Watertight Index 0.04 0.022 0.005 0.005 
Improvement  45.0% 87.5% 87.5% 
Airtight Index 0.061 0.060 0.059 0.059 
Improvement  1.6% 3.3% 3.3% 
 Number of closures opened by evacuees/initially closed 
Watertight Doors 21/47 12/47 12/49 12/47 
Watertight Hatches 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 
Watertight Scuttles 6/23 0/23 0/23 1/23 
Airtight Doors 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Airtight Hatches 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
Non-tight Doors 65/85 61/85 63/85 63/85 
Table 14. Objective function, evacuation time and ship integrity comparison for 










Figure 16.   Comparing dynamic and static escape routes for new design: additional 
forecastle exit under port condition 
 




E. MODEL DETAILS AND ALGORITHM PERFORMANCE 
 
Table 15 summarizes the computational performance and results of our model 






 Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic
Objective Index (Z*) 0.5792 0.4283 0.4554 0.3385 0.3259 0.2615 
LP relaxation objective 0.5781 0.4224 0.4553 0.3387 0.3259 0.2567 
Lower Bound Index (Z0) 0.2612 0.2195 0.2608 0.2137 0.2777 0.2212 
Gap (Z* - Z0) 0.318 0.2088 0.1946 0.1248 0.0482 0.0403 
Number of groups 40 40 90 90 54 54 
Number iterations 5 7 5 7 4 6 
Total time 82 127 1,788 7,647 59 83 
 













































Table 15. Summary of computational results. The “initial” number of constraints, 
binary variables and non-zero elements are recorded in the last iteration 
of the solution heuristic. “Presolved” numbers are the “initial” values 
after the Xpress presolver has operated on and simplified the model. 
All cases are solved after four to seven iterations, and require between 54 seconds 
(static port case) and 7,647 seconds (dynamic watch case). The latter case is much more 
difficult to solve than others. However, we note that its objective value is within 1.2% of 
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the final solution after the fourth iteration, and four iterations only require 2,637 seconds. 
Thus, additional research may show it possible to stop earlier with a solution of 
acceptable quality. 
The gap between the best objective value found and the lower bound obtained 
after the first iteration (which assumes maximum walking speed and all closures to be 
open), is smaller for the port scenario than for the general-quarters scenario. This is 
attributable to the fact that fewer closures are closed in the port case: The ordered MCR is 
XRAY, which entails the greatest number of open closures. The smallest gap is about 




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
We have developed a network-based optimization model to plan the escape routes 
in a naval ship using dynamically configured escape signals. As part of a full “dynamic 
escape route system’’ (DER), these signals can guide crewmembers to escape routes that 
are modified depending on the contingency. For instance, if an enemy weapon is 
expected to hit a particular section of the ship, routes can be configured to avoid that 
section. The routes are also modified depending on the physical distribution of the crew, 
which can vary widely depending on the ship’s status (e.g., in port) and the passages used 
by repair parties. 
The evacuation process is represented by a nonlinear network-flow optimization 
model (with side constraints). The model is driven not only by the goal of reducing 
average evacuation time (as is typically the case in evacuation models for buildings, 
mass-transit vehicles and passenger ships), but also by the importance of maintaining 
watertight and airtight integrity. We solve the model heuristically with good results, 
although bounds on solution quality are weak in practice. An important feature of our 
model is that we are able take in account the time variable without employing a time-
phased network notably reducing the computational effort. 
We use the ÁLVARO DE BAZÁN, a modern Spanish frigate, as the “test 
subject.” We demonstrate that a DER on that ship could (1) reduce mean evacuation time, 
and (2) improve the ship’s integrity by reducing the number of closures that must be 
opened to facilitate escape.  Both improvements are key to reducing the risks that 
evacuees face and increasing the likelihood of a later safe rescue.  
Specifically, DER can improve evacuation time up to 20% and improve the time 
of the last group of evacuees up to 30% compared to a system of static routes. The 
number of closures that must be opened is reduced by as much as 25%, also. The smallest 
improvements are achieved under a general-quarters scenario with no damage to the ship 
(for instance, only a 10.9% improvement in evacuation time). However, these small 
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improvements probably just indicate that the static escape-route plan, taken from the 
ship’s technical drawings, has been designed for this scenario.  
Unlike a static plan, DER can adapt to damage incurred in combat, or while 
harbored, as in the case of the USS COLE. Moreover, we demonstrate that the DER can 
be used to analyze the value that design changes can have with respect to evacuation 
effectiveness. For instance, we show that increasing in passage widths by only 10% on 
the ÁLVARO DE BAZÁN, could further reduce mean evacuation time between 25% and 
45% depending on the scenario.  
Escape trunks and vertical trunks, which connect lower-deck compartments with 
upper-decks passages, play an important role in the evacuation process and are the 
preferred escapes routes for the crewmembers located in engine rooms, and certain other 
compartments. Escape trunks are an attractive alternative to companionways because 
using them reduces a ship’s integrity only minimally, and they can offer good fire and 
smoke protection to evacuees. We recommend the use of one or more escape trunks in all 
the manned compartments below the damage control deck (Deck 2). 
Our DER model also identifies groups of crewmembers that are the last to escape 
(although this is not stated explicitly as model’s objective). This could be useful for 
planning the appropriate distribution of emergency breathing devices. 
 Overall, we demonstrate that DER can contribute to reducing risks faced by 
sailors in the event of an evacuation. Furthermore, the optimization model could be a 
useful tool for the effective design of a naval ship. We recommend further study using 
fully vetted data and simulation exercises, on existing ships and ship prototypes, to 
validate the DER concept. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The accuracy of the evacuation time calculated by the DER model depends 
greatly on the estimated speed function used and the estimated times to open closures of 
various sorts. Most of the walking-speed functions described in the literature describe 
people moving in buildings, unconstrained spaces and mass-transit vehicles. The models 
cover a wide range of ages and fitness conditions for the walkers, but do not account for 
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the peculiarities of naval ships; for instance, slopes on stairs, differ notably between a 
ship and a civilian building, and escape trunks are not the same as fire-escape ladders or 
stairs.  Experimentation and full trials onboard naval ships should be carried out to find 
the best possible estimates for speed functions and closure-opening times. 
We have assumed that crewmembers move in indivisible groups, but some 
improvements might be possible by requiring groups to split.  Experimentation on this 
topic would be interesting. 
In our computational study, the opening of any individual closure of a given type 
has been assumed to degrade a ship’s integrity equally.  But, this ignores much detail 
about a ship’s construction.  For instance, a watertight door opening into a large 
compartment may be more important than a watertight door opening into a small 
compartment, because of a greater potential for flooding in the former case.  More 
research will be required to model such effects more accurately.  Additional research 
might also lead to a model in which at least some doors are re-closed by the last 
crewmember passing through them: In a real evacuation, some would be closed and some 
would remain open. 
We have solved the DER model heuristically, and in some cases, our lower 
bounds are weak: In those cases we cannot guarantee that our solution is near optimal. 
Stronger bounds can be sought by, for example, by anticipating the minimum number of 
doors that need to be opened (instead of assuming, when calculating the bound, that all 
doors are already open). 
The model, of course, can be enhanced in many other aspects. For example, we 
may contemplate stochasticity in parts of the evacuation process, including injuries to 
people. We have assumed that closures require fixed times to open, but deformations due 
to explosions, heat and flood may cause times to vary stochastically, and even make 
closures impossible to open. 
We also encourage the investigation of a time-phased network for modeling 
purposes. Such a model might improve solution accuracy by reducing the number of 
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APPENDIX A. MATERIAL CONDITION OF READINESS 
The Material Condition of Readiness (MCR) is the degree of access and system 
closure in effect at any time on a naval ship. Naval ships have three basic MCRs: XRAY, 
YOKE and ZEBRA. 
Closures such as doors, hatches and scuttles will remain open or closed depending 
on the MCR established, in anticipation of potential damage. Each MCR affords the ship 
with some level of protection, with XRAY providing the least protection and ZEBRA the 
most. On the other hand, the ZEBRA MCR provides the least degree of crew mobility on 
board, so it is only adopted during General Quarters. A more detail explanation follows; 
• Condition XRAY: This provides the least watertight integrity and the greatest 
access throughout the ship. It is set during working hours when the ship is at 
home base and no attack is expected. Only closures marked with “X” and 
“Circle X” are closed; 
• Condition YOKE: Provides a level of watertight integrity greater than XRAY 
and is set at port and sea during war time and in port during non-working 
times. Closures marked with “X”, “Y”, “Circle X” and “Circle Y” are closed; 
• Condition ZEBRA: This MCR provides the greatest degree of watertight 
integrity and is established during following situations: 
o Immediately after ordering General Quarters. 
o Entering or leaving port during war time. 
o When controlling the spread of a fire or other damage when the crew 
is not at General Quarters 
• Modified YOKE and ZEBRA: These are relaxations of the standard YOKE 
and ZEBRA, respectively, which can be ordered at discretion of the 
Commanding Officer; 
70 
• WILLIAM: Fittings (anything that may be opened or closed such as a door, 
vent or valve) are secured only as necessary to control damage or limit 
contamination from a chemical, biological, or radiological attack. 
The MCR in each compartment is enforced by the crew responsible for the 
compartment but may be accomplished, in an emergency, by a repair party. 
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APPENDIX B. CREW LOCATION 
Tables 16-22 in this appendix show the crew distribution for the Spanish frigate 
ÁLVARO DE BAZÁN by location (all decks and levels) and condition (General 
Quarters, Watch and Port); the data are derived from technical drawings. The tables also 
show the maximum expected occupancy of a compartment. The group’s name is that as 
the compartment, following standard notation described in appendix C. Table 23 contains 





Watch Port Max 
5-217-0-C Sonar Dome 1 0 0 1 
4-193-1-C Sonar Equipment Room 6 3 0 6 
4-171-2-E Aux. Engines #1 1 0 0 1 
4-155-0-E Aux. Engines #2 1 1 0 1 
4-141-0-E Diesel Generators #1 2 1 0 2 
4-123-0-E Propulsion Engines Room #1 2 1 0 2 
4-106-0-E Aux Engines #3 2 1 0 2 
4-89-0-E Propulsion Engines Room #2 2 1 0 2 
4-70-0-E Diesel Generators #2 2 1 0 2 
4-56-0-E Aux Engines #4 1 0 0 1 
 TOTAL 20 9 0 20 
Table 16. Crew Location – Deck 4 and below 
 
Group Name General 
Quarters
Watch Port Max 
3-203-1-M Ammo Magazine 2 1 0 0 
3-169-2-L2 Rating's Berth #1 0 4 12 12 
3-167-2-L2 Rating's Berth #2 0 4 12 12 
3-160-2-L2 PO's Berth #2 0 2 6 6 
3-160-1-L2 PO's Berth #1 0 3 8 8 
3-152-1-L2 PO's Berth #4 0 3 8 8 
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Group Name General 
Quarters
Watch Port Max 
3-150-2-L2 PO's Berth #3 0 3 8 8 
3-150-4-L2 PO's Berth #5 0 2 6 6 
3-60-2-L2 Rating's Berth #5 0 4 12 12 
3-59-2-L2 Rating's Berth #4 0 3 9 9 
3-59-1-L2 Rating's Berth #3 0 3 9 9 
3-54-4-L2 Rating's Berth #7 0 3 9 9 
3-53-3-L2 Rating's Berth #6 0 3 9 9 
3-47-2-L2 Rating's Berth #8 0 4 12 12 
3-47-1-L2 Rating's Berth #9 0 3 9 9 
3-40-3-L2 PO's Berth #6 0 3 8 8 
3-40-4-L2 PO's Berth #9 0 2 6 6 
3-40-2-L2 PO's Berth #8 0 2 6 6 
3-40-1-L2 PO's Berth #7 0 2 6 6 
3-32-1-L2 PO's Berth #10 0 2 6 6 
3-32-2-L2 PO's Berth #11 0 2 6 6 
3-3-0-E Servo 3 1 0 0 
 TOTAL 5 59 167 167 
Table 17. Crew Location – Deck 3 
 
Group Name General 
Quarters
Watch Port Max 
2-211-0-E Windlass Room 16 8 0 0 
2-188-3-M Mk41 Equipment Room 1 0 0 0 
2-168-1-L2 CPO's Cabin #1 0 1 3 3 
2-168-2-L2 CPO's Cabin #2 0 1 3 3 
2-168-4-L2 CPO's Cabin #3 0 1 3 3 
2-160-3-L2 Officer's Cabin #1 0 1 2 2 
2-160-1-L2 Officer's Cabin #2 0 0 1 2 
2-160-2-L2 Officer's Cabin #3 0 1 2 2 
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Group Name General 
Quarters
Watch Port Max 
2-160-4-L2 Officer's Cabin #4 0 0 2 2 
2-151-3-L2 Officer's Cabin #5 0 1 2 2 
2-151-1-L2 Officer's Cabin #6 0 1 2 2 
2-151-2-L2 Officer's Cabin #7 0 1 2 2 
2-151-4-L2 Officer's Cabin #8 0 0 2 2 
2-143-1-L1 CPO's Messroom 0 3 0 26 
2-141-2-L1 CPO's Living 0 6 0 17 
2-131-1-C2 Repair Station #5 16 8 0 0 
2-130-2-L1 Living and Emergency Room 0 1 4 4 
2-120-2-L3 General Office 0 2 0 0 
2-109-1-L3 Bakery 2 0 0 0 
2-106-2-L3 Galley 4 2 0 0 
2-97-2-C2 Repair Station #4 16 8 0 0 
2-96-1-L2 PO's Living 0 9 0 17 
2-88-1-L2 Rating's Living 0 7 0 20 
2-69-0-L1 PO's Messroom 0 20 0 88 
2-57-0-C1 Platform Control 6 3 0 0 
2-55-1-C1 Enginering Office 0 2 0 0 
2-54-2-L2 CPO's Cabin #4 0 1 4 4 
2-47-1-L2 CPO's Cabin #5 0 1 2 2 
2-47-0-C1 Inertial Navigation Room 3 1 0 0 
2-47-2-L2 CPO's Cabin #6 0 1 4 4 
2-40-3-L2 CPO's Cabin #7 0 1 4 4 
2-40-1-L2 CPO's Cabin #8 0 1 4 4 
2-40-2-L2 CPO's Cabin #9 0 1 4 4 
2-40-4-L2 CPO's Cabin #10 0 1 4 4 
2-31-1-C2 Repair Station #3 16 8 0 0 
2-31-4-L2 CPO's Cabin #12 0 1 4 4 
2-31-2-L2 CPO's Cabin #11 0 1 4 4 
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Group Name General 
Quarters
Watch Port Max 
2-21-2-L3 Supply Office 0 1 0 0 
2-3-3-B Nixie Room 3 3 0 0 
2-0-1-B Atas Room 2 1 0 0 
 TOTAL 101 110 62 231 
Table 18. Crew Location – Deck 2 
 
Group Name General 
Quarters
Watch Port Max 
1-161-1-C2 Damage Control #2 10 0 0 0 
1-144-0-C1 CS Equip Room #2 5 2 0 0 
1-130-1-L2 CO Cabin 0 0 0 1 
1-127-2-L2 Chiefs Cabin #1 0 1 1 1 
1-123-2-L2 Chiefs Cabin #2 0 0 1 1 
1-122-1-L2 XO Cabin 0 0 1 1 
1-117-4-L2 Officer's Cabin #10 0 1 1 2 
1-117-2-L2 Officer's Cabin #9 0 0 2 2 
1-108-1-L1 Officer's Wardoom 0 2 1 19 
1-106-4-L1 Officer's Messroom 0 2 1 26 
1-103-2-L3 Officer's Pantry 0 2 0 2 
1-97-2-L2 Officer's Cabin #11 0 1 2 2 
1-92-1-L2 Chief's Cabin #3 0 0 1 1 
1-93-2-L2 Officer's Cabin #12 0 1 1 2 
1-88-2-L2 Officer's Cabin #13 0 0 2 2 
1-87-1-L4 Treatment Room 6 3 0 4 
1-81-1-L4 Hospital 0 1 0 5 
1-71-5-M Torpedo Magazine #1 2 1 0 0 
1-71-6-M Torpedo Magazine #2 2 1 0 0 
1-61-5-L4 Gymnasium 0 1 0 0 
1-57-2-L3 Hangar 9 4 0 0 
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Group Name General 
Quarters
Watch Port Max 
 TOTAL 34 23 14 71 
Table 19. Crew Location – Deck 1 
Group Name General 
Quarters
Watch Port Max 
01-155-2-C1 CIC 16 8 0 0 
01-155-1-C1 CIC 16 8 0 0 
01-138-1-L Meeting Room 0 3 0 0 
01-119-2-C1 Main Communications Center 8 4 0 0 
01-68-1-C1 Control Stm 12 5 0 0 
01-54-2-C Sec Radio Center 2 1 0 0 
01-48-2-M Meroka Equip Room 3 2 0 0 
01-46-1-C1 Control Flight 2 1 0 0 
 TOTAL 59 32 0 0 
Table 20. Crew Location – Deck 01 
Node Name General 
Quarters
Watch Port Max 
02-158-1-C1 Navigation Bridge 10 4 0 0 
02-158-2-C1 Navigation Bridge 10 4 0 0 
02-149-6-L3 CO Pantry 0 1 0 0 
02-142-1-L2 CO Cabin 0 0 1 1 
02-142-2-L2 FO Cabin 0 0 1 6 
 TOTAL 20 9 2 7 
Table 21. Crew Location – Deck 02 
 
Group Name GQ Watch Port Max 
03-158-0-C Fly Bridge 6 3 0 6 
 TOTAL 6 3 0 6 
Table 22. Crew Location – Deck 03 
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5-217-0-C Sonar Dome 130.20 0.00 0.00 
4-193-1-C Sonar Equipment Room 115.95 1.01 2.64 
4-171-2-E Aux. Engines #1 102.60 −0.79 2.28 
4-155-0-E Aux. Engines #2 93.18 0.00 2.03 
4-141-0-E Diesel Generators #1 84.60 0.00 1.80 
4-123-0-E Propulsion Engines Room #1 73.98 0.00 1.51 
4-106-0-E Aux Engines #3 63.60 0.00 1.31 
4-89-0-E Propulsion Engines Room #2 53.36 0.00 1.31 
4-70-0-E Diesel Generators #2 42.13 0.00 1.31 
4-56-0-E Aux Engines #4 33.69 0 1.31 
3-203-1-M Ammo Magazine 122.08 0.52 5.81 
3-169-2-L2 Rating's Berth #1 101.10 −4.42 5.24 
3-167-2-L2 Rating's Berth #2 99.90 −0.33 5.21 
3-160-2-L2 PO's Berth #2 96.00 −4.78 5.10 
3-160-1-L2 PO's Berth #1 95.91 4.81 5.10 
3-152-1-L2 PO's Berth #4 91.31 2.46 4.98 
3-150-2-L2 PO's Berth #3 90.30 −2.26 4.95 
3-150-4-L2 PO's Berth #5 90.30 −6.23 4.95 
3-60-2-L2 Rating's Berth #5 36.00 -5.68 4.31 
3-59-2-L2 Rating's Berth #4 35.13 −1.82 4.31 
3-59-1-L2 Rating's Berth #3 35.11 0.79 4.31 
3-54-4-L2 Rating's Berth #7 32.58 −5.89 4.31 
3-53-3-L2 Rating's Berth #6 32.06 5.68 4.31 
3-47-2-L2 Rating's Berth #8 28.50 −5.48 4.31 
3-47-1-L2 Rating's Berth #9 28.18 5.58 4.31 
3-40-3-L2 PO's Berth #6 24.22 5.49 4.31 
3-40-4-L2 PO's Berth #9 24.20 −4.66 4.31 
3-40-2-L2 PO's Berth #8 24.20 −1.56 4.31 
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3-40-1-L2 PO's Berth #7 23.99 1.56 4.31 
3-32-1-L2 PO's Berth #10 19.11 5.01 4.31 
3-32-2-L2 PO's Berth #11 18.35 −5.11 4.31 
3-3-0-E Servo 1.78 0.00 4.31 
2-211-0-E Windlass Room 126.83 0.00 7.722 
2-188-3-M Mk41 Equip Room 112.64 1.26 7.339 
2-168-1-L2 CPO's Cabin #1 100.65 3.08 7.015 
2-168-2-L2 CPO's Cabin #2 100.65 −0.10 7.015 
2-168-4-L2 CPO's Cabin #3 100.65 −3.30 7.015 
2-160-3-L2 Officer's Cabin #1 96.05 4.55 6.891 
2-160-1-L2 Officer's Cabin #2 96.05 1.61 6.891 
2-160-2-L2 Officer's Cabin #3 95.94 −1.19 6.888 
2-160-4-L2 Officer's Cabin #4 95.94 −3.77 6.888 
2-151-3-L2 Officer's Cabin #5 90.54 3.31 6.742 
2-151-1-L2 Officer's Cabin #6 90.50 0.53 6.741 
2-151-2-L2 Officer's Cabin #7 90.46 −2.32 6.740 
2-151-4-L2 Officer's Cabin #8 90.35 −5.17 6.737 
2-143-1-L1 CPO's Messroom 85.80 2.46 6.614 
2-141-2-L1 CPO's Living 84.43 −4.30 6.577 
2-131-1-C2 Repair Station #5 78.32 5.20 6.412 
2-130-2-L1 Living and Emergency Room 78.00 −3.90 6.403 
2-120-2-L3 General Office 72.15 −4.42 6.245 
2-109-1-L3 Bakery 65.40 2.40 6.095 
2-106-2-L3 Galley 63.55 −3.81 6.095 
2-97-2-C2 Repair Station #4 57.99 −5.23 6.095 
2-96-1-L2 PO's Living 57.44 3.79 6.095 
2-88-1-L2 Rating's Living 52.98 4.14 6.095 
2-69-0-L1 PO's Messroom 41.62 0.00 6.095 
2-57-0-C1 Platform Control 34.20 0.00 6.095 
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2-55-1-C1 Enginering Office 33.16 5.46 6.095 
2-54-2-L2 CPO's Cabin #4 32.34 −5.27 6.095 
2-47-1-L2 CPO's Cabin #5 28.04 4.86 6.095 
2-47-0-C1 Inertial Navigation Room 28.00 −0.04 6.095 
2-47-2-L2 CPO's Cabin #6 28.00 −4.84 6.095 
2-40-3-L2 CPO's Cabin #7 24.23 4.93 6.095 
2-40-1-L2 CPO's Cabin #8 24.23 1.74 6.095 
2-40-2-L2 CPO's Cabin #9 24.17 −1.50 6.095 
2-40-4-L2 CPO's Cabin #10 24.17 −4.63 6.095 
2-31-1-C2 Repair Station #3 18.57 3.35 6.095 
2-31-4-L2 CPO's Cabin #12 18.52 −3.78 6.095 
2-31-2-L2 CPO's Cabin #11 18.51 −0.64 6.095 
2-21-2-L3 Supply Office 12.59 −6.09 6.095 
2-3-3-B Nixie Room 1.77 6.02 6.095 
2-0-1-B Atas Room -0.02 3.38 6.095 
1-161-1-C2 Damage Control #2 96.60 1.04 10.62 
1-144-0-C1 CS Equip Room #2 86.11 0.00 10.34 
1-130-1-L2 CO Cabin 78.00 4.92 10.12 
1-127-2-L2 Chiefs Cabin #1 76.09 −5.79 10.07 
1-123-2-L2 Chiefs Cabin #2 73.58 −5.79 10.00 
1-122-1-L2 XO Cabin 73.20 4.63 9.99 
1-117-4-L2 Officer's Cabin #10 70.38 −6.08 9.91 
1-117-2-L2 Officer's Cabin #9 70.37 −2.96 9.91 
1-108-1-L1 Officer's Wardoom 64.94 2.17 9.81 
1-106-4-L1 Officer's Messroom 63.38 −4.78 9.81 
1-103-2-L3 Officer's Pantry 61.80 -0.31 9.81 
1-97-2-L2 Officer's Cabin #11 58.53 −5.49 9.81 
1-92-1-L2 Chief's Cabin #3 55.67 5.00 9.81 
1-93-2-L2 Officer's Cabin #12 55.65 −5.46 9.81 
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1-88-2-L2 Officer's Cabin #13 52.76 −5.46 9.81 
1-87-1-L4 Treatment Room 52.37 5.43 9.81 
1-81-1-L4 Hospital 48.59 5.45 9.81 
1-71-5-M Torpedo Magazine #1 42.77 6.01 9.81 
1-71-6-M Torpedo Magazine #2 42.30 −6.18 9.81 
1-61-5-L4 Gymnasium 36.45 6.43 9.81 
1-57-2-L3 Hangar 34.10 −1.30 9.81 
01-155-2-C1 CIC 92.91 −4.41 13.32 
01-155-1-C1 CIC 92.91 4.42 13.32 
01-138-1-L Meeting Room 82.80 5.98 13.04 
01-119-2-C1 Main Comm Center 71.40 −4.04 12.73 
01-68-1-C1 Control Stm 41.10 5.76 12.61 
01-54-2-C Sec Radio Center 32.68 −7.49 12.61 
01-48-2-M Meroka Equip Room 28.70 −6.54 12.61 
01-46-1-C1 Control Flight 27.90 2.60 12.61 
02-158-1-C1 Navigation Bridge 94.99 3.38 16.18 
02-158-2-C1 Navigation Bridge 94.99 −3.38 16.18 
02-149-6-L3 CO Pantry 89.23 −1.98 16.02 
02-142-1-L2 CO Cabin 85.49 3.22 15.92 
02-142-2-L2 FO Cabin 85.33 −1.55 15.92 
03-158-0-C Fly Bridge 94.8 0 19.065 
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APPENDIX C. COMPARTMENT DESIGNATION NUMBERING 
SYSTEM 
In 1949, the Compartment Designation Numbering System (CDNS) 
(Compartment Letters for Ships, 2005) was established by the U.S. Navy. Every 
compartment, hatch, door or bulkhead on board, except in minor spaces, is uniquely 
identified by a set of letters and numbers, providing information on the compartment’s 
location and function. This symbol is marked on a label and secured to the compartment, 
hatch, door or bulkhead. 
We use a similar convention to label the nodes in our network. Those who are 
familiar with the CDNS can easily identify a node and locate its position onboard. This 
set of letters and numbers consists of a deck number, a station number (the ship’s length 
is divided into roughly equally spaced “stations,” each one corresponding to a structural 
member such as a stiffener or frame member), a relative position of the compartment 
respect to the centerline, and a letter that represents the usage of the compartment. For 
example, the label in Figure 17 corresponds to a compartment on the third deck, forward 
the ship, station 75, it is the second compartment outboard of the centerline to port side 
and it is used for ammunition storage. 
 
Figure 17.   Example of node label following CDNS standard 
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A. DECK NUMBERS 
The deck number indicates the vertical position of the compartment within the 
ship. The main deck, that is, the first continuous watertight deck that runs from the bow 
to the stern, receives the number 1. Decks below the main deck are the second, third, 
fourth decks, etc. and are numbered as 2, 3, 4 and so forth, respectively. Decks above the 
main deck are referred to as “levels” and numbered 01, 02, 03, i.e., a zero precedes the 
deck number. Numbers increase from the main deck towards the keel and upwards. 
The frigate under study (see Figure 18) has three decks below the main deck and 
eight levels above the main deck, but crew is not expected to be above Level 04. 










Figure 18.   Deck numbers.  
When a compartment such as an engine room extends through more than one 
deck, it receives the lowest relevant deck number. 
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B. FRAME NUMBER 
 Frame number (see Figure 19.  ) indicates the relative position from the AP, that 
is, the rudder stock centerline located at the station 0. When identifying a compartment, 
the frame number corresponds to the aftermost bulkhead of the compartment. 
Note that a different convention prevails in the U.S. Navy: station 0 is located at 
the FP and the frame number indicates the foremost bulkhead of the compartment. 
100 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220 230
 
Figure 19.   Station number 
  
C. SIDE NUMBER 
The side number (see Figure 20) indicates the relative position of the 
compartment to the ship centerline. Compartments located on the centerline of the ship 
are numbered as 0. Compartments on the starboard side have odd numbers and 
compartments on port side have even numbers. When there is more than one 











Figure 20.   Side number. 
 
D. USAGE LETTER 
The usage letter indicates the primary use of the compartment. For instance, “L” 
stands for living spaces (berthing and messing spaces, staterooms, washrooms and sick 
bay) and “G” stands for gasoline stowage compartments. For completeness, we list the 
usage letters here and their meanings: 
• A: Dry stowage storerooms, issue rooms, refrigerated spaces; 
• B: Guns spaces; 
• C: Ship control and fire control operating spaces, plotting rooms, CIC, radio, 
radar, sonar operating spaces, pilothouse; 
• E: Engineering spaces, main propulsion spaces; pump, generator, and windlass 
rooms; 
• F: Oil stowage fuel oil, diesel oil, and lubricating oil tanks; 
• G: Gasoline stowage, gasoline tank compartments, cofferdams, trunks, and pump 
rooms; 
• J: JP-5 tanks, aircraft fuel stowage; 
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• K: Chemicals and dangerous materials, stowage of chemicals and semi-safe and 
dangerous materials, except oil and gasoline tanks; 
• L: Living spaces, berthing and messing spaces, medical and dental areas, and 
passageways; 
• M: Ammunition stowage and handling.  
• Q: Spaces not otherwise covered, e.g., ship’s offices, laundry rooms, galleys, 
pantries, and wiring trunks; 
• T: Vertical access trunks; 
• V: Void cofferdam compartments, other than gasoline and void wing 
compartments; 
• W: Water stowage compartments, including bilge, sump, and peak tanks; and, 
• AA: Spaces used to carry cargo. 
Some letters are unnecessary to our work since we do not expect to find 
crewmembers in compartments such as void spaces (letter V) or fresh-water stowage 
spaces (letter W). But we are interested in differentiating spaces like damage-control 
repair stations or berthing spaces that would normally fall into the same category. 
The reason for this division into subcategories is that, based on the type of 
compartment, we are able to estimate the difficulty that occupants may have to find the 
exit: we assume that it will be easier to find the compartment exit from a relatively 
sparsely outfitted living space, than it will be in an engine room packed with equipment. 
This effect is captured by the “permeability factor” which we embed in our model as part 
of arc lengths. 
We expand the standard classification scheme by adding some subcategories: 
• B: Gunnery spaces; 
• C1: Ship control spaces;   
• C2: Damage control repair stations;   
• E: Engineering spaces;   
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• L1: Living spaces;   
• L2: Berthing spaces;   
• L3: Working spaces;   
• L4: Medical spaces;   
• M: Ammunition magazine;   
• T: Passage or corridor; 
• T1: Access trunk; 
• T2: Vertical trunk; and, 
• T3:  Escape trunk. 
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APPENDIX D. CLOSURES 
Table 24 lists a variety of closures typical on naval ships.  
Symbol Description Symbol  Description 
AD Armored Door  HMHC Hinged Manhole Cover  
AH  Armored Hatch  LP Low Profile  
AHC Ammunition Hoist Cover  MHC Manhole Cover  
AHD  Ammunition Hoist Door  MIG Metal Inert Gas 
AP  Air Port  NTD Non-tight Door  
AQAES Armored Quick-Acting Escape Scuttle  PS Passing Scuttle  
AS  Armored Scuttle  QA Quick-Acting  
ATC Air Test Cap  QAAD Quick-Acting Armored Door  
ATD  Airtight Door  QAAH Quick-Acting Armored Hatch  
AT/FZ Airtight/Firezone Door QAAS Quick-Acting Armored Scuttle  
ATS Airtight Scuttle  QAATD Quick-Acting Airtight Door  
AWTD Armored Watertight Door  QAES Quick-Acting Escape Scuttle 
AWTH  Armored Watertight Hatch  QAWTD Quick-Acting Watertight Door  
BA Ballistic Armor  QAWTH Quick-Acting Watertight Hatch  
BERP Bolted Equipment Removal Plate  QAWTS Quick-Acting Watertight Scuttle  
BP Baffle Ports  RLP Ramped Low Prole  
CRES Corrosion Resistant Steel  SMAW Shielded Metal Arc Welding 
FTD Firetight Door  TIG Tungsten Inert Gas  
FT/FZ Fumetight Firezone (Door)  WTC Watertight Closure  
GPR Glass-Reinforced Plastic  WTD Watertight Door 
GTAW Gas Tungsten Arc Welding  WTH Watertight Hatch  
Table 24. Extensive list of closures on naval ships 
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Figures 21-26 show closures that have been explicitly modeled in our research by 
establishing (a) time to open and (b) effect on watertight or airtight integrity, if opened. A 
short description of these closures follows. For more details, see the damage control 
booklet Watertight Closures (2000). 
• Quick-acting watertight doors. These doors are located in high traffic areas, such 
as in the superstructure where they give access to the weather decks, main 
passageways, and manned spaces (Combat Information Center, Radio Central, 
Machinery Control Central, or Damage Control Central). Ship Integrity Index 
Weight γn=0.75 x 0.50. 
 
Figure 21.   Quick- Acting WTD 
• Quick-acting airtight doors. These doors are located above the V-lines and are 
used to access fan rooms, storerooms, and spaces where interior bulkheads are 
required to be airtight. These doors prevent the spread of fire, toxic vapors, and 
smoke. Ship Integrity Index Weight γn=0.25 x 0.50. 
 
 
Figure 22.   Quick Acting ATD 
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• Raised watertight hatches. These hatches are installed in areas where rapid access 
is not required. They do not have escape scuttles, and are usually used for 
onloading or offloading stores and access for heavy equipment engine rooms and 
stores. Ship Integrity Index Weight γn=0.75 x 0.40. 
 
Figure 23.   Raised WTH 
• Raised watertight hatches with scuttles. These hatches are in places where rapid 
access or egress is required. They have escape scuttles to provide rapid access or 
egress, and are usually located above berthing compartments, manned and 
unmanned machinery spaces, and all deck levels. Ship Integrity Index Weight 
γn=0.75 x 0.10. 
 
Figure 24.   Raised WTH with Scuttle 
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• Raised watertight scuttles. These scuttles are installed in interior and exterior 
areas, and provide an alternate access to manned or unmanned spaces, machinery 
spaces, or storerooms. Ship Integrity Index Weight γn=0.25 x 0.10. 
 
Figure 25.   Raised WTS 
• Flush watertight scuttles. These scuttles are installed in areas such as flight decks, 
cargo decks, hangar decks, passageways, or areas of relatively high traffic where 
a flush deck condition is required. Ship Integrity Index Weight γn=0.75 x 0.10. 
 
 




Table 25 lists closure locations on ÁLVARO DE BAZÁN frigate, along with the 
closure type and mark. 








5-215-0-T2 T2 X Scuttle 128.73 0.00 0.00 
4-209-0-T2 T2 X Scuttle 125.27 0.00 2.90 
4-198-2-WTD WTD Y Compartment Access 118.84 -0.52 2.72 
4-172-1-WTD WTD Y Compartment Access 103.09 2.87 2.30 
4-170-1-WTD WTD Y Compartment Access 102.00 3.34 2.27 
4-159-2-WTD WTD X Escape Trunk Access 95.37 -4.16 2.09 
4-155-1-WTD WTD Y Compartment Access 93.00 4.31 2.02 
4-135-1-WTD WTD X Escape Trunk Access 81.03 5.72 1.70 
4-133-2-WTD WTD X Escape Trunk Access 79.83 -5.72 1.67 
4-99-1-WTD WTD X Escape Trunk Access 59.40 5.72 1.31 
4-76-2-WTD WTD X Escape Trunk Access 45.60 -6.24 1.31 
3-209-0-WTS WTS X Scuttle 125.27 0.00 5.90 
3-203-2-WTD WTD Y Ammo Magazine 
Access 
121.60 -0.52 5.80 
3-201-2-WTH WTH Y Access Trunk Hatch 120.45 -1.00 5.77 
3-172-1-WTD WTD Y Compartment Access 103.17 3.44 5.30 
3-172-4-D NTD X Non-tight Door 103.15 -2.43 5.30 
3-171-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 102.70 -1.37 5.29 
3-171-4-T2 T2 X Trunk 102.53 -5.39 5.28 
3-169-1-WTH WTH Y Access Trunk Hatch 101.26 4.06 5.25 
3-159-2-WTD WTD X Escape Trunk Access 95.40 -5.20 5.09 
3-157-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 93.60 -4.37 5.04 
3-156-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 93.43 3.78 5.03 
3-156-8-D NTD X Non-tight Door 93.00 -4.90 5.02 
3-154-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 92.40 -2.07 5.01 
3-153-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 91.80 6.29 4.99 
3-151-1-WTH WTH Y Access Trunk Hatch 90.74 4.31 4.96 
92 








3-150-1-WTD WTD Y Compartment Access 89.49 5.94 4.93 
3-149-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 89.20 2.19 4.92 
3-149-3-WTD WTD Y Compartment Access 88.76 3.64 4.91 
3-143-4-WTD WTD Y Compartment Access 85.76 -5.62 4.83 
3-141-2-WTH WTH Y Access Trunk Hatch 84.45 -4.68 4.79 
3-139-2-WTD WTD Y Compartment Access 83.40 -3.74 4.76 
3-135-1-WTD WTD X Escape Trunk Access 81.05 6.24 4.70 
3-133-2-WTD WTD X Escape Trunk Access 79.80 -6.24 4.67 
3-116-1-WTD WTD Y Compartment Access 69.63 7.26 4.39 
3-111-1-WTD WTD Y Compartment Access 66.68 1.04 4.31 
3-110-1-WTD WTD Y Compartment Access 66.18 0.35 4.31 
3-99-1-WTD WTD X Escape Trunk Access 59.40 6.24 4.31 
3-85-2-WTD WTD Y Compartment Access 50.96 -7.27 4.31 
3-76-2-WTD WTD X Escape Trunk Access 45.60 -6.84 4.31 
3-70-3-WTD WTD Y Compartment Access 42.10 6.14 4.31 
3-68-1-WTH WTH Y Access Trunk Hatch 40.60 5.20 4.31 
3-66-2-WTH WTH Y Access Trunk Hatch 39.67 -4.16 4.31 
3-64-1-WTD WTD Y Compartment Access 38.62 3.08 4.31 
3-64-2-WTD WTD Y Compartment Access 38.45 -4.68 4.31 
3-62-2-T2 T2 X Trunk 37.26 -6.83 4.31 
3-61-1-WTD WTD Y Compartment Access 36.70 3.12 4.31 
3-59-3-WTH WTH Y Access Trunk Hatch 35.25 2.65 4.31 
3-57-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 34.20 -3.70 4.31 
3-56-1-WTD WTD Y Compartment Access 33.30 3.70 4.31 
3-54-5-D NTD X Non-tight Door 32.60 4.16 4.31 
3-54-3-D NTD X Non-tight Door 32.45 3.12 4.31 
3-54-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 32.45 0.68 4.31 
3-54-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 32.45 -1.70 4.31 
3-53-6-D NTD X Non-tight Door 31.70 -4.10 4.31 
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3-51-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 30.60 -3.70 4.31 
3-49-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 29.45 3.12 4.31 
3-37-3-D NTD X Non-tight Door 22.01 3.82 4.31 
3-37-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 22.00 1.45 4.31 
3-37-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 22.00 -1.70 4.31 
3-37-4-D NTD X Non-tight Door 22.00 -4.68 4.31 
3-36-5-D NTD X Non-tight Door 21.50 4.33 4.31 
3-36-8-D NTD X Non-tight Door 21.49 -5.90 4.31 
3-35-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 21.00 -4.92 4.31 
3-32-3-T2 T2 X Trunk 19.35 7.16 4.31 
3-22-2-T1 T1 Y Access Trunk 13.39 -3.62 4.31 
2-214-2-WTD WTD Y Fore Peak Access 128.00 -1.50 7.754 
2-209-2-WTS WTS X Scuttle 125.38 -1.54 7.683 
2-208-2-WTD WTD X Subdivision 124.80 -2.92 7.668 
2-203-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 121.82 -2.81 7.587 
2-200-2-WTH WTH Y Hatch 120.24 -2.04 7.544 
2-199-1-WTD WTD Z Compartment Access 119.35 3.73 7.520 
2-198-4-WTD WTD Z Compartment Access 118.98 -3.29 7.510 
2-190-2-WTD WTD X Subdivision 114.00 -4.75 7.376 
2-190-1-WTD WTD X Subdivision 114.50 4.75 7.389 
2-189-1-WTD WTD Z Compartment Access 113.43 2.88 7.361 
2-188-2-WTD WTD Z Compartment Access 112.80 -0.51 7.343 
2-187-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 112.20 -4.42 7.327 
2-173-1-WTD WTD X Subdivision 103.80 6.17 7.100 
2-173-2-WTD WTD X Subdivision 103.80 -6.17 7.100 
2-172-4-D NTD X Non-tight Door 103.30 -4.92 7.087 
2-172-5-D NTD X Non-tight Door 103.28 5.65 7.086 
2-171-3-D NTD X Non-tight Door 102.90 2.76 7.076 
2-171-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 102.90 0.21 7.076 
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2-171-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 102.90 -3.63 7.076 
2-169-1-WTH WTH Y Hatch 101.22 5.21 7.030 
2-165-3-WTD WTD Z Compartment Access 99.40 5.92 6.981 
2-164-1-WTD WTD X Subdivision 98.40 6.76 6.954 
2-164-2-WTD WTD X Subdivision 98.40 -6.76 6.954 
2-162-1-WTD WTD X Subdivision 97.19 6.76 6.921 
2-162-2-WTD WTD X Subdivision 97.19 -6.76 6.921 
2-160-6-WTD WTD X Escape Trunk Access 96.00 -5.70 6.889 
2-156-3-D NTD X Non-tight Door 93.70 4.93 6.827 
2-156-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 93.70 1.44 6.827 
2-156-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 93.70 -0.67 6.827 
2-156-4-D NTD X Non-tight Door 93.70 -4.13 6.827 
2-154-3-D NTD X Non-tight Door 92.72 3.61 6.801 
2-154-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 92.72 0.12 6.801 
2-154-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 92.72 -1.99 6.801 
2-154-4-D NTD X Non-tight Door 92.72 -5.44 6.801 
2-153-3-WTD WTD Y Access Trunk 92.13 6.66 6.785 
2-152-1-WTH WTH Y Hatch 90.91 5.33 6.752 
2-147-2-WTD WTD X Subdivision 88.20 -7.55 6.679 
2-147-1-WTD WTD X Subdivision 88.20 7.56 6.679 
2-143-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 85.57 -7.04 6.608 
2-141-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 84.80 7.12 6.587 
2-140-2-WTH WTH Y Hatch 84.15 -6.26 6.569 
2-139-2-WTD WTD Y Access Trunk 83.10 -7.16 6.541 
2-134-1-WTD WTD X Subdivision 80.40 7.90 6.468 
2-136-1-WTD WTD X Escape Trunk Access 81.60 6.76 6.500 
2-134-4-WTD WTD X Subdivision 80.38 -7.90 6.467 
2-132-2-WTD WTD X Escape Trunk Access 79.20 -6.76 6.435 
2-131-3-D NTD X Non-tight Door 78.60 7.28 6.419 
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2-130-4-D NTD X Non-tight Door 78.00 -6.24 6.403 
2-121-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 72.40 -7.28 6.252 
2-121-1-WTD WTD Y Access Trunk 72.33 7.28 6.250 
2-119-1-WTH WTH Y Hatch 71.18 6.71 6.219 
2-112-1-WTD WTD X Subdivision 67.20 7.99 6.111 
2-112-2-WTD WTD X Subdivision 67.20 -7.99 6.111 
2-110-1-WTD WTD X Subdivision 66.00 7.99 6.095 
2-110-2-WTD WTD X Subdivision 66.00 -7.99 6.095 
2-110-0-D NTD X Non-tight Door 65.90 0.52 6.095 
2-105-1-WTD WTD Y Access Trunk 62.91 1.22 6.095 
2-104-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 62.70 -7.28 6.095 
2-104-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 62.42 0.52 6.095 
2-101-1-WTD WTD X Subdivision 60.00 8.05 6.095 
2-101-2-WTD WTD X Subdivision 60.00 -8.05 6.095 
2-97-1-WTD WTD X Escape Trunk Access 58.80 6.76 6.095 
2-96-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 57.70 -7.28 6.095 
2-96-3-D NTD X Non-tight Door 57.47 6.24 6.095 
2-91-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 54.60 7.28 6.095 
2-83-4-WTH WTH Y Hatch 49.59 -6.70 6.095 
2-80-2-WTD WTD Y Access Trunk 48.00 -6.71 6.095 
2-78-1-WTD WTD X Subdivision 46.80 7.97 6.095 
2-77-4-WTD WTD X Escape Trunk Access 46.21 -7.28 6.095 
2-78-6-WTD WTD X Subdivision 46.80 -7.97 6.095 
2-72-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 43.00 7.28 6.095 
2-71-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 42.70 -7.28 6.095 
2-66-1-WTD WTD Y Access Trunk 39.39 7.28 6.095 
2-63-1-WTD WTD X Subdivision 38.30 7.87 6.095 
2-63-2-WTD WTD X Subdivision 38.30 -7.87 6.095 
2-62-5-WTD WTD X Subdivision 37.80 7.88 6.095 
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2-62-4-WTD WTD X Subdivision 37.27 -7.88 6.095 
2-62-2-S WTS X Scuttle 37.27 -6.83 6.095 
2-62-3-WTD WTD Y Access Trunk 37.20 4.94 6.095 
2-62-1-WTD WTD Y Access Trunk 37.20 3.12 6.095 
2-58-3-WTH WTH Y Hatch 35.08 3.67 6.095 
2-58-3-D NTD X Non-tight Door 34.62 7.28 6.095 
2-51-2-WTD WTD Z Compartment Access 30.61 -2.08 6.095 
2-51-4-D NTD X Non-tight Door 30.60 -5.55 6.095 
2-49-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 29.69 5.24 6.095 
2-49-2-WTD WTD Z Compartment Access 29.69 -1.03 6.095 
2-49-4-D NTD X Non-tight Door 29.69 -5.24 6.095 
2-44-1-WTD WTD X Subdivision 26.40 7.80 6.095 
2-44-2-WTD WTD X Subdivision 26.40 -7.80 6.095 
2-40-6-WTH WTH Y Hatch 23.87 -6.73 6.095 
2-37-3-D NTD X Non-tight Door 21.93 4.76 6.095 
2-37-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 21.93 1.94 6.095 
2-37-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 21.93 -1.62 6.095 
2-37-4-D NTD X Non-tight Door 21.93 -4.44 6.095 
2-36-8-D NTD X Non-tight Door 21.38 -5.31 6.095 
2-36-5-D NTD X Non-tight Door 21.36 5.72 6.095 
2-35-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 20.92 -0.37 6.095 
2-35-4-D NTD X Non-tight Door 20.92 -3.94 6.095 
2-33-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 19.65 5.72 6.095 
2-32-1-S WTS X Scuttle 19.35 7.14 6.095 
2-27-2-WTD WTD X Subdivision 16.20 -7.52 6.095 
2-27-1-WTD WTD X Subdivision 16.20 6.29 6.095 
2-25-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 15.00 -6.50 6.095 
2-24-2-WTD WTD Z Compartment Access 14.50 -4.17 6.095 
2-22-2-WTH WTH Y Hatch 13.38 -3.64 6.095 
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2-9-2-WTD WTD X Subdivision 5.38 -2.58 6.095 
2-8-2-WTD WTD Z Compartment Access 4.85 -2.56 6.095 
2-8-3-S WTS X Scuttle 4.85 6.60 6.095 
2-5-3-WTD WTD Z Compartment Access 2.80 4.16 6.095 
2-3-1-WTD WTD Z Compartment Access 1.80 3.15 6.095 
2-2-2-WTS WTS X Scuttle 1.34 -2.70 6.095 
2-1-2-WTD WTD Z Compartment Access 0.75 -3.61 6.095 
1-214-2-WTS WTS X Scuttle 128.9 -2.293 11.49 
1-196-2-WTS WTS X Scuttle 118.02 -2.295 11.20 
1-189-2-WTS WTS X Scuttle 113.5 -1.552 11.08 
1-187-1-WTS WTS X Scuttle 112.25 0.5 11.04 
1-165-1-WTS WTS X Scuttle 99.17 5.13 10.69 
1-164-1-WTD WTD X Forecastle WTD 98.40 7.56 10.67 
1-158-1-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 94.80 7.67 10.57 
1-158-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 94.80 -0.49 10.57 
1-158-4-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 94.80 -5.70 10.57 
1-151-1-WTH WTH Y Hatch 90.75 6.24 10.46 
1-150-1-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 89.70 7.07 10.43 
1-143-2-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 86.04 -7.69 10.34 
1-143-1-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 85.85 7.18 10.33 
1-139-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 83.40 -2.50 10.26 
1-138-2-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 82.79 -7.75 10.25 
1-131-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 78.60 7.28 10.13 
1-128-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 76.80 -7.78 10.09 
1-121-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 72.90 -7.78 9.98 
1-121-1-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 72.30 7.28 9.96 
1-119-1-WTH WTH Y Hatch 71.11 6.71 9.93 
1-117-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 70.20 4.85 9.91 
1-114-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 68.40 -2.64 9.86 
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1-114-4-D NTD X Non-tight Door 68.40 -6.09 9.86 
1-112-1-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 67.20 6.93 9.83 
1-112-2-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 67.20 -8.30 9.83 
1-109-1-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 65.40 6.94 9.81 
1-110-2-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 66.00 -8.30 9.81 
1-107-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 63.99 6.10 9.81 
1-106-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 63.60 2.05 9.81 
1-106-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 63.60 -2.04 9.81 
1-103-1-D NTD X Non-tight Door 61.80 2.02 9.81 
1-102-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 61.11 -7.81 9.81 
1-97-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 58.53 -7.81 9.81 
1-93-3-D NTD X Non-tight Door 56.00 3.40 9.81 
1-92-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 55.34 -7.81 9.81 
1-87-2-D NTD X Non-tight Door 52.49 -7.80 9.81 
1-86-3-D NTD X Non-tight Door 51.31 3.40 9.81 
1-83-2-WTH WTH Y Hatch 49.66 -5.72 9.81 
1-83-3-D NTD X Non-tight Door 49.66 3.60 9.81 
1-80-2-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 48.00 -4.70 9.81 
1-71-3-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 42.60 3.40 9.81 
1-70-2-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 42.00 -1.29 9.81 
1-71-4-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 42.55 -3.12 9.81 
1-65-1-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 39.00 2.34 9.81 
1-63-1-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 37.80 2.34 9.81 
1-61-3-D NTD X Non-tight Door 36.67 4.16 9.81 
1-58-3-WTH WTH Y Hatch 34.90 3.68 9.81 
1-53-2-T2 T2 X Scuttle 32.00 -4.57 9.81 
1-52-2-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 31.20 -4.16 9.81 
1-49-1-S S X Scuttle 28.97 2.16 9.81 
1-48-1-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 28.55 2.38 9.81 
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1-46-1-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 27.62 1.56 9.81 
1-44-1-WTD WTD X Flight Deck WTD 26.40 2.38 9.81 
1-44-2-ATD ATD Y Compartment Access 26.40 1.30 9.81 
1-8-1-WTS WTS X Scuttle 4.85 6.63 9.81 
1-(1)-2-WTH WTH Y Hatch -0.88 -3.65 9.81 
01-147-2-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 88.21 -4.75 13.19 
01-147-1-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 88.21 4.68 13.19 
01-145-1-ATH ATH Y Hatch 87.14 6.30 13.16 
01-142-1-D NTD Z Compartment Access 85.20 4.11 13.11 
01-133-2-S WTS X Scuttle 79.94 -6.79 12.97 
01-125-2-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 75.00 -7.28 12.83 
01-116-2-ATH ATH Y Hatch 69.46 -6.97 12.68 
01-114-2-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 68.40 -7.86 12.65 
01-112-2-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 67.20 -7.86 12.62 
01-99-3-WTS WTS X Scuttle 59.46 6.73 12.61 
01-91-1-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 54.60 4.16 12.61 
01-88-1-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 53.00 3.33 12.61 
01-87-1-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 52.35 2.86 12.61 
01-86-1-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 51.60 2.07 12.61 
01-85-2-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 51.21 -4.51 12.61 
01-84-1-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 50.40 2.03 12.61 
01-82-2-ATH ATH Y Hatch 49.32 -3.56 12.61 
01-82-4-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 49.20 -4.68 12.61 
01-80-2-D NTD Z Compartment Access 47.60 -3.56 12.61 
01-74-2-S WTS X Scuttle 44.25 -2.08 12.61 
01-71-3-D NTD Z Compartment Access 42.89 2.60 12.61 
01-66-1-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 39.60 2.12 12.61 
01-65-2-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 39.00 -4.68 12.61 
01-63-2-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 37.80 -4.68 12.61 
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01-63-1-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 37.80 2.12 12.61 
01-62-1-S WTS X Scuttle 37.42 1.96 12.61 
01-58-3-ATH ATH Y Hatch 35.09 3.65 12.61 
01-57-4-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 34.20 -5.21 12.61 
01-53-2-S WTS X Scuttle 32.01 -4.59 12.61 
01-51-2-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 30.60 -4.67 12.61 
01-48-1-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 29.00 2.08 12.61 
01-48-3-S WTS X Scuttle 28.60 2.72 12.61 
02-157-3-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 94.20 6.76 16.16 
02-157-1-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 94.20 6.18 16.16 
02-157-2-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 94.20 -6.18 16.16 
02-157-4-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 94.20 -6.76 16.16 
02-153-1-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 91.51 4.22 16.08 
02-153-2-ATD ATD Y Airtight Door 91.51 -4.22 16.08 
02-149-4-D NTD Z Non-tight Door 89.36 -1.15 16.03 
02-146-2-D NTD Z Non-tight Door 87.69 -1.15 15.98 
02-146-1-D NTD Z Non-tight Door 87.69 1.20 15.98 
02-146-4-ATH ATH Y Hatch 87.48 -3.61 15.97 
02-146-3-ATH ATH Y Hatch 87.47 3.72 15.97 
02-135-1-WTS WTS X Scuttle 80.94 6.76 15.80 
02-77-2-WTS WTS X Scuttle 46.23 -6.73 15.41 
02-74-2-WTS WTS X Scuttle 44.25 -2.11 15.41 
02-62-1-WTS WTS X Scuttle 37.36 1.93 15.41 
02-58-1-WTH WTH X Hatch 34.96 3.67 15.41 
02-48-1-WTS WTS X Scuttle 28.60 2.70 15.41 
03-148-1-T2 T2 Null Vertical Trunk 88.5 5.35 19.065 
03-148-2-T2 T2 Null Vertical Trunk 88.5 -5.35 19.065 
Table 25. Closure location on ÁLVARO DE BAZÁN frigate. 
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